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 In this thesis, I analyze the use of milk as a symbol for white supremacy and masculinity 
in four different case studies: the protest of Shia Lebouf’s He Will Not Divide Us art installation, 
the 4chan thread “Enter the Milk Zone,” Richard Spencer’s 2017 Twitter bio, and PewDiePie’s     
S O Y B O Y S. In this ideological criticism, I examine the use of milk as a means of culture 
jamming, the act of taking an entities’ message/symbol and appropriating/changing it to level 
criticism. I first examine the arguments being made with milk appropriation to construct an 
ideology of the alt-right. Then, for milk appropriation, I argue that the alt-right is culture jamming 
the political left by muddying our understanding of the alt-right by the appropriation of normative 
symbols, utilizing superiority humor to differentiate themselves, and establishing an affective 
political identity of trolling that exists as a means of subverting the political and social order. 
Ultimately, I argue that this analysis is useful for developing further solutions in opposing and 
countering the alt-right’s harmful rhetorical practices. 
Keywords: Alt-Right, Culture Jamming, Political Aesthetic, Superiority Humor, milk   
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Rationale for Study 
 In February of 2017, a group of protestors formed outside of Shia LeBeouf’s anti-Trump 
art installation, “He Will Not Divide Us,” that was meant to call for people to stay unified despite 
the newly elected President Donald Trump’s divisive rhetoric. During the protest of this 
installation, there were several shirtless, white men carrying around half-gallons of milk (Freeman, 
2017). Throughout the course of the protests, many of the young, white men chugging milk would 
yell internet lingo from the online message boards 4chan and Reddit, such as “my gains!” and 
“cuck” and “vegan agenda” (Tekajin, 2017). The centerpiece of this protest, though, was the milk 
that they chugged in solidarity. This choice of beverage appears puzzling on the surface, especially 
for someone who does not pay attention to the cultural development of these specific internet 
subcultures, the alt-right and manosphere. Symbols provides a language for groups to rally around 
and communicate with. Given milk’s history of cultural and symbolic value, understanding its 
interpretation by the alt-right and the manosphere, groups that propagate white nationalism and 
hypermasculinity, can provide a window into their ideology.  
We live in a culture inundated with online content, whether they be memes, tweets, or 
comments. In this sea of information, dog-whistles, coded language that only a specific group of 
people can recognize, become powerful weapons by organizing forces that are “meant to draw the 
attention of some, while going unnoticed by others,” (Moshin, 2018). As certain actions and words 
move into the realm of unacceptability, hate groups find ways to speak to their audience through 
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coded language to avoid the repercussions of their speech. Dog-whistles have the very real 
consequence of allowing hateful terms and ideas to become normalized and are ways for 
communities to coalesce around common understanding.  
With the rise of right-wing nationalist attacks, such as the planned kidnapping of Michigan 
Governor Gretchen Whitmer and the January 6 Insurrection at the United States Capitol, there is 
a pressing need to understand how the alt-right and other far right groups use both anonymous and 
non-anonymous online platforms to mainstream their ideology. Symbols and objects such as milk 
are ripe for analysis and can provide insight into the motivations and beliefs of the alt-right. The 
perspective presented in this analysis is coming from an acknowledgment of the danger that white 
nationalism poses in American politics, culture, and law. The Department of Homeland Security 
(2021) issued an advisory on January 27, 2021 that domestic extremism, fostered in communities 
such as the ones under study today, poses an imminent national security risk. The alt-right and 
their ideological factions and segments propose a society that is fundamentally at odds with belief 
in the equity of humankind. The alt-right correctly understands the power of the internet in shaping 
the very political and socio-economic systems that govern our lives.  
Though, there also must be an acknowledgment that there is no quantifiable way to define 
the alt-right’s membership because of how distributed their ideology is, how it exists at various 
crossroads with other ideologies, and how it is followed to different degrees among different 
people. Thus, Marantz (2019) argues that many rightwing and online movements from 2015 to 
2018 were swept under the title “alt-right.” Thus, this analysis will frequently use the terms “alt-
right” and online right interchangeably to describe the cultural and social textures surrounding 
online right-wing movements, and the term “manosphere” will be reserved for specifically 
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discussing the anti-feminist and hypermasculine portion of the internet, keeping in mind that the 
crossover in membership of the manosphere and alt-right is significant (Lewis, 2019).  
Woods & Hahner (2019) make the argument that many of the alt-right’s beliefs, such as 
extreme perspectives on immigration and their desire for a white ethno-state, combined with their 
appreciation for ridiculously over-the-top internet trolls were brought from sites such as 4chan and 
Reddit to mainstream social media sites like Twitter and Facebook. The alt-right’s worship of 
Donald Trump led many members to the alt-right to create and distribute pro-Trump memes and 
anti-Hillary cartoons/conspiracy theories. This online presence garnered the attention of the 
general public and put the term “alt-right” into the public consciousness and normalized their ideas 
for the realm of serious political discourse (Woods & Hahner, 2019). Their disregard for truth and 
tech-savviness are concerning on their own, but combined with a very real lack of information 
literacy among digital citizens, forces such as the alt-right become extremely dangerous in the 21st 
century. This analysis is not politically neutral and ought to provide greater strategies and methods 
to counter white nationalism and its related ideologies. Sparby (2017) advocates for studying 
4chan and other gathering sites for abusive rhetoric as a call to counter messages of hate by 
understanding exactly how these sites develop collective identity and export their ideologies to 
other people. 
I argue that understanding how the online right uses milk symbolism can illuminate their 
ideology, both in their spoken and unspoken arguments. To interrogate this phenomenon, I ask the 
following research questions:  
RQ 1: How does the symbolic value of milk represent the ideology of the alt-right? 
RQ 2: How does the alt-right use humor in the context of culture jamming to spread their ideology? 
RQ3: How does the political aesthetic generated by culture jamming support alt-right ideology?  
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Ultimately, I argue that the alt-right culture jams liberalism1 by re-appropriating the symbolism of 
milk as an ideology of white supremacy and masculinity. Specifically, this culture jam is achieved 
through the rhetoric of superiority humor and an affective political aesthetic of trolling. One main 
contribution of this study is showing how culture jamming, a form of resistance historically 
identified in anti-corporatism and feminism (Lasn, 1999), is not just used by left-wing activists but 
that it is also a rhetorical strategy leveraged by the alt-right, albeit with a different ideology and 
type of prankster. This has implications for understanding both how events like the Capitol 
Insurrection can effectively organize and how symbolic appropriation affects the stability of our 
digital public discourse. 
Overview of Study 
To answer these questions, I will conduct a review of relevant literature on both the online 
groups under analysis and the theoretical frameworks I plan to use in my analysis, namely culture 
jamming, superiority humor, and political aestheticization. I will then provide a description of my 
method of criticism and the following case studies under analysis: The protest of the #HWNDU 
art installation, Richard Spencer’s Twitter bio in early 2017, the “Enter the Milk Zone” 4chan 
thread, and the Youtube star PewDiePie’s video S O Y B O Y S. Then, for my analysis, I will situate 
the appropriation of milk through the theoretical lens of culture jamming. I will first examine the 
arguments that are being made in these texts to highlight how milk is imbued with the values of 
the alt-right and manosphere. Second, I will examine how superiority humor operates as a vehicle 
for carrying out this culture jam, specifically how humor functions in this appropriation and to 
what end it helps the alt-right and manosphere accomplish their goals. Third, I will establish the 
relationship between culture jamming and trolling in these texts and how they contribute to the 
 
1 Liberalism, as used here, will refer to culturally progressive ideas surrounding gender, race, social issues, etc., and 
not the specific political philosophy. 
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formation of a political aesthetic, one that I term the “Troll Ethos.” Finally, I will situate this 






Chapter 2: Literature Review 
The Alt-Right 
The term “alt-right” was first coined by self-described white nationalist, Richard Spencer, 
who wanted to create an alternative vision for the political right in America. He saw that the good 
ol’ boy Texas Republican politics was not going far enough to achieve what he refers to as the 
goal of “Western cultural greatness.” Much of his conception of protecting Western society 
originated from Friedrich Nietzsche’s nihilism, specifically the idea that democracy has failed to 
fulfill the greatness of mankind because democracy asserts that people should be the decision 
makers in their own lives, whereas Nietzsche believed in the strength of the “ubermensch,” a man 
of superior intellect and strength that could lead the world into prosperity (Wood, 2017). Spencer 
views his mission as defending the cultural tradition of “his people,” i.e. those of Anglo-Saxon, 
Germanic, and Scandinavian descent, an ideology grounded in fascism. This fascist intellectual 
tradition, for Spencer, worked incredibly well on the internet, where this ideology existed on Neo-
Nazi sites such as Stormfront (SPLC, 2021) but was also spreading to sites like 4chan and Reddit.  
The history, composition, and major events of internet discourse can be understood as “a 
response to a response to a response,” (Nagle, 2017). Throughout the 2010s, culture wars prompted 
the creation and intensification of the online right to a degree that has not been seen before in the 
digital world. Nagle (2017) further argues that what is now known as the alt-right was cobbled 
together from anonymous messaging boards, where mostly young, white men threw their fists 
against the wall of cultural liberalism that had become prevalent on sites such as Tumblr. This 
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common attitude along with grievances about “political correctness” would unite white 
supremacists/nationalists, “edge lords,” and men’s rights activists under the banner of the alt-right. 
Not only did these groups unite under this title, but they were able to export this ideology to 
mainstream viewers on Twitter and Facebook through deliberately placed “fake news” and internet 
memes with missing context (Woods & Hahner, 2019). The website, 4chan, served as an important 
venue for the development of these groups and ideology. 
 4chan was created in 2005 by 15-year-old Christopher Poole, who created it as an off-shoot 
of the obscure online discussion board, Something Awful, which was a forum for discussions of 
video games and comics. There was a propensity for users on Something Awful to engage in humor 
that was not politically correct and often incredibly dark, fitting for a site called Something Awful 
(Beran, 2017). 4chan soon became a playground of sorts for adolescent boys to express taboo ideas 
and views behind a veil of ironic internet memes and insensitive rhetoric. Here the cloak of 
anonymity provided many of its users the ability to say anything they wanted without fear of social 
repercussions (Beran, 2017). The culture of 4chan was and, to a lesser degree, continues to be a 
space of free speech taken to the extreme, a space where users rely on “edgy” humor to derive 
satisfaction from being offensive for the sake of being offensive, of ruffling feathers.  
Over the next several years, this forum attracted individuals from across the internet. Cyber 
libertarian minded young men took to the site in droves, many of them holding a disgust for the 
platitudes of cultural liberalism entering the mainstream fueled by a nihilistic philosophy of the 
world (Nagle, 2017). There were also the young, conservative men who grew a hatred for what 
they perceive to be the ridiculousness of liberal politics (third/fourth wave feminism, LGBTQIA+ 
movements, expanding categories of social identity). This community was also populated by those 
who created and propagated some of the original internet memes that rose to mainstream 
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popularity, such as the doge (a picture of a Shiba Inu dog often accompanied by misspelled text) 
and the forever alone memes that depicted depressed poorly drawn comics (Sparby, 2017). In this 
brand of humor, 4chan made its mark of being the worst place on the internet. An example of this 
type of humor can be seen in Lamont’s (2019) analysis of the meme Pedobear, who is a fictional 
bear taken from the cover of a Fallout boy album that was used as a name for someone treading 
close or crossing over into pedophilic territory. Lamont (2019) describes a culture of 4chan that 
revels in transgressive and offensive content as a means of accomplishing a few goals. First, users 
on this platform take issues that are normally serious in nature such as pedophilia, racism, sexism, 
and terrorism to infuse them with humor in order to grab people’s attention. Second, this 
transgressive humor allows for users of the board to establish a subcultural identity whose purpose 
Lamont (2019) traces back to punk and anti-establishment subcultures, that of subversive rebellion 
against normal standards of decency. The very spirit of subversion that inspired alternative punk 
cultures of the 1970s through the 1990s has entered into a much different ideological and digital 
sphere. Not only is this humor meant to transgress, though, but it also smooths over its rougher 
texture with the veneer of irony. 
DeCook (2020) highlights that irony is often used as a defense for racism and sexism 
prevalent in the alt-right, even highlighting how the Youtuber, PewDiePie, had claimed irony as 
an excuse for the use of racist and anti-Semitic language. These taboo and offensive opinions are 
posted, as Woods & Hahner (2019) describe, “for the lulz” or the satisfaction of offending and 
transgressing as a means of bonding with others in the community and realizing one’s place in this 
landscape of ideology. This veneer of irony imbued into alt-right rhetoric allows for what I will 
argue later as plausible deniability of transgression, a shield of sorts. 
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The ideological predisposition and character of 4chan made it the perfect venue for the alt-
right and, subsequently, their favorite presidential candidate Donald Trump to thrive. Many of the 
users on the site supported and promoted Trump for a variety of reasons, from agreeing with his 
xenophobic rhetoric about immigrants to enjoying the chaos that Trump represented, doing it “for 
the lulz” or fulfilling a need to enjoy the most offensive and politically incorrect version of reality 
(Woods & Hahner, 2019). The alt-right encompasses many ideologies, but the primary 
significance of the alt-right has been in how influential they have become in American politics, 
from creating memes featuring Donald Trump to intentionally spreading fake news and hoaxes to 
increasingly sharpen political divisions (Woods & Hahner, 2019). This strategy is so effective that 
Russia used this very line of attack on public discourse to interfere in the 2016 election in a way 
that the alt-right and 4chan had been doing for years. The appropriation of scientific data that is 
present in the thread under analysis today is one more example of how 4chan and the alt-right were 
able to insert themselves into mainstream political discourse, through providing themselves the 
legitimacy of scientific inquiry. 
Nagle (2017) contends that the alt-right’s disproportionate influence over the development 
of politics during the Trump era were derived from the theories of Antonio Gramsci, who stated 
“that political change follows from cultural and social change.” This philosophy of action and 
motivation frames the alt-right as a movement that does not try to convince those in positions of 
power to change their policies. Rather, it is a movement that aims to reframe people’s worldview 
through a normalization of transgressive rhetoric and politics. The political shift here is less about 
policy and becomes more about cultural and social identity (Mason, 2018). A good example of 
this form of politics are “triggered” memes. These memes are meant to make fun of people who 
utilize or call for trigger warnings, disclosures of content in media that can activate a trauma 
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response based on a person’s past experiences. With mostly feminists calling for trigger warnings 
at the time of their increasing popularity (Halberstam, 2017), this practice invited derision from 
members of the alt-right who made fun of trigger warnings by saying someone who is 
uncomfortable with or disagrees with an offensive idea is “triggered.” Thus, “triggering” someone, 
expressly violating a person’s sensibilities is a form of Gramscian politics. The message is to defeat 
political correctness; you stand your ground in the culture war by offending those that wish to 
change you. This form of politics is abundant in our current political landscape, both online and 
offline. In order to understand how the alt-right has exacerbated this approach to politics, it is 
important to situate the alt-right, what many would claim to be a fringe political movement, into 
the broader context of white grievance and racial politics. 
Over the last several decades, racial identity has come to shape many of our conversations 
surrounding politics and social issues. Ramos-Zayas (2020), in her analysis of whiteness studies 
literature, writes about this idea popularized by W.E.B Dubois (1963) called “psychological 
wage,” an affordance of economic, social, and political benefits afforded to white people for 
grounding their identity and their communities in the white race as opposed to economic class. 
Ramos-Zayas (2020) reviews various literature from contemporary whiteness studies that ground 
her work in this concept of the “psychological wage” that include subjects that are critical for the 
development of white identity politics grounded in affect and racial fear, which include: 
immigration, patriotism, economic anxiety, and the legacy (and continuity) of institutionalized 
racism. 
Immigration has occupied an important place in racial politics, both in terms of policy and 
cultural mindsets. From the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 to the Trump administration’s harsh 
detainment and deportation policies, immigrants have been situated in American life as marginal 
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others who exist at the fringes of society, never fully integrated (Witteborn, 2011). Cisneros (2008) 
identified a common trope of U.S. immigration coverage as situating immigrants metaphorically 
as pollutants. Even in Europe, this anti-immigrant rhetoric and metaphors of invasion and pollution 
have been extended to Syrian refugees (Stratfor Geopolitical Diary, 2013). Ramos-Zayas (2020) 
highlights that immigration intersects with many of the other factors of white identity and politics, 
such as how economic anxiety is often paired with anxieties over immigration, that the racial other 
will endanger the economic well-being of people in the United States, often understood to be white 
people. Though it is important to highlight that in the history of American anti-immigrant 
sentiment that there has been an unequal valuation of European immigrants compared to other 
immigrants during the 19th century, where many European immigrants congregated under white 
supremacy to take their place and privilege in white American Society (Zinn, 2015). Ramos-Zayas 
(2020) further discusses how a political economy of whiteness is generated through the legacy and 
continuation of institutionalized racism, particularly by highlighting how the Ku Klux Klan was 
not an aberrational organization that existed outside of mainstream society. Rather, the KKK 
occupied a prevalent role in communities throughout the United States. Even if small in 
membership, the KKK generated feelings of community pride and the integrity of a racial order 
that served many people living in predominately white areas, that “Klan was thoroughly 
American.”  
Ramos-Zayas (2020) concludes her analysis by reflecting on how children are socialized 
into whiteness. Looking at the racial makeup of schools and neighborhoods, racial segregation is 
still incredibly prevalent American life (Blackwood, 2020). Parents move to communities that 
reflect their racial identities and socialize their kids into activities with people of similar racial 
backgrounds. While these barriers of diversity and multi-culturalism are being broken down by 
18 
 
activists and legislators, the chasm is still wide. At the same time, a denial of racism’s existence 
as a systemic problem is built so heavily into whiteness as a cultural identity, where the fragility 
of white feelings and safety from cognitive dissonance is prized over addressing racism as a 
systemic issue (DiAngelo, 2018).  This fragility generates a defensive position that the alt-right 
takes advantage of in its discourse. While politics of white identity generate a collective grievance 
against immigrants and black people, a simultaneous denial of this oppression is built into white 
identity politics. While the alt-right explicitly announces their white supremacy, many people are 
more hesitant or even morally opposed to blatant white supremacy, but the alt-right has learned 
how to traffic their ideology and target this white identity politics through their maneuvering on 
social media. As mentioned earlier, the usage of internet memes and targeted political messaging 
about immigration that mirrored Trump’s approach to calling Mexicans “rapists and murderers” 
targeted this white identity politics (Woods & Hahner, 2019). Appealing to this particularly 
Gramscian version of politics allows for alt-right thought to enter the mainstream. Not only does 
this transgressive framework of political action center race in its discourse, specifically concerning 
milk appropriation, but masculinity and gender is also a critical component to understand. 
The Manosphere 
Race is not the only social force that online rightwing movements organize around. Notions 
of masculinity and the hatred and harassment of women and feminism holds an important place in 
this discussion. Not only is online sexism important for understanding the online right, but milk is 
also appropriated in the case studies through the insult and concept of the “soy boy,” an insult 
leveled at men who “lack all necessary masculine qualities,” (Sommer, 2017). This came to 
represent any man on the cultural left, originating from findings that soy has phytoestrogens, or 
plant-based estrogens (Schaefer, 2015) that were claimed to increase estrogen levels in people that 
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consume it. Subsequently, as I will discuss later in my analysis, dairy milk is used as a masculine 
symbol. This use of milk can best be explained by understanding those inhabiting what is known 
as the manosphere. 
The manosphere is a collection of online websites, pages, and groups that espouse 
misogynistic ideas under the guise of liberating men, that modern civilization has done irreparable 
damage to masculinity and that women have disempowered men in modern society (Cohen, 2015). 
The manosphere is comprised of Men’s Rights Activists, Incels, and Pick-up Artists who all have 
a different reason for their distaste for femininity and women, but these groups inhabit similar 
spaces and share sets of memes and terminology. Men’s Rights Activists believe that men are 
disadvantaged in society. Incel stands for “involuntary celibate” and describes a group of men that 
resent women because of their own lack of sexual activity. Pick-up Artists are men that view 
women as prizes to be won, and the act of doing so is both an artform and means of manipulating 
the “game.” These groups embraced a philosophy of anti-feminism that became a very powerful 
political force on 4chan, Reddit, and certain parts of mainstream social media. The manosphere 
flocked to these sites over time to safeguard spaces that they considered belongs to them and that 
are being “threatened” by efforts of inclusion and diversity (Nagle, 2017).  
No other event exemplified the character of the manosphere more than Gamergate, which 
was a collection of controversies centered around women video game journalists and critics, with 
two women in particular, Zoe Quinn and Anita Sarkeesian, being the center of the manosphere’s 
hatred. Zoe Quinn, developer of the indie game, Depression Quest, was targeted by right-wing 
trolls as accusations of her sleeping with a game reviewer circulated the internet. Anita Sarkeesian, 
a feminist video game critic, had a series of videos on her channel, Feminist Frequency, where she 
applied feminist critique to video games. Online communities within 4chan and Reddit did 
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everything from calling them misogynistic names to sending them death threats to issuing bomb 
threats at their speaking events (Dewey, 2014). Gamergate represents the kind of group trolling 
that has come to characterize the manosphere. Lewis (2019) argues that the manosphere that rose 
to prominence during GamerGate, also laid the necessary groundwork for the alt-right to blossom. 
This was evident by both the presence of Replacement theory, a theory that the white male majority 
power holders are being replaced by women and racial minorities, and the fact that the alt-right 
and manosphere operate on the same sites and social media pages. (Lewis, 2019). During the 
period after GamerGate, a wealth of anti-feminist websites and pages arose in response to the 
growing fourth-wave feminism that is allowing women more agency to decide whom they have 
sex with as opposed to those decisions being “dictated by families, religion, or the state,” (Lewis, 
2019). Groups of men flocked to the internet to vent their frustration with this status quo, that their 
sexual urges and rights as men are not being satisfied, spurring the rise of communities like incels 
and Men’s Rights Activists.  
These anxieties, as I will show are present in the ideological textures of milk when it comes 
to the conceptualization of the “soy boy.” While both the alt-right and manosphere apply their own 
definitions to milk, understanding the history of milk symbolism is important to understanding 
where this appropriation fits into that history. 
Milk and its symbolic history  
Milk is referenced in the alt-right through many ideological frames, whether as a testament 
of racial superiority (Holt, 2018) or assertion of masculinity in the face of “soy boys,” (PewDiePie, 
2018). Milk came to occupy the symbolic realities of the alt-right. Stanescu (2018) observed that 
milk being used in this white power construction is nothing new. Frequently, the ability to digest 
dairy and a people’s access to meat came to represent an idea of superiority in brain function and 
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stamina (Stanescu, 2018). This interpretation of the benefits associated with consumption of 
certain foods and beverages was formed by the biased interpretation of an economically and 
socially dominant group of people justifying their own domination over others. Genetic racism, 
the study of how different races are genetically and biologically distinct, was incredibly prevalent 
in the structure of American academic and cultural thought throughout the 19th and 20th centuries 
(Painter, 2011). Part of this cultural story is that the consumption of animal products was tied to a 
version of American exceptionalism, the dominant, masculine, and white men that led the nation 
into “greatness” and “expansion,” (Stanescu, 2018). This myth brings into question the 
significance of milk and its symbolic history in Europe and the United States. 
Throughout history, milk was representative of different values that illuminated very 
distinct things about a culture. For instance, Aristotle thought of “milk as nature” or milk as a 
perfect window into the mysteries and potentials of life, transferring the essence and ability of one 
being into that of another, but many Grecians regarded drinking milk as a barbarous act, only 
acceptable when making cheese (Valenze, 2011). Attitudes changed during the Renaissance when 
milk started being viewed as a nourishing force. Many women in famous Greek tales would 
“nurse” a loved one back to health, often referencing both directly and indirectly breasts as the 
source of the nutrition (Valenze, 2011). Milk represented vastly different things to different 
cultures and eventually began to be shown in a more positive light by the 20th century.  
After mass hunger and the accumulation of dietary research in the United States during 
World War I, the federal government invested heavily in the dairy industry to reduce the price of 
milk and encouraged the use of it in hunger alleviation campaigns. This move earned Americans 
the title of “great milk drinkers” as it eventually became an engrained part of the American diet 
(Valenze, 2011). Milk continued to dominate American dietary standards and cultural mindsets, 
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from the delivery of milk to households during the 1920s due to the lack of refrigeration technology 
to the “Got Milk” campaign of the 90s. In the focus group that eventually led to the generation of 
the iconic slogan, “Got Milk?” people described milk as a critical part of their diet, almost a 
ritualistic consumption, with one man who described going downstairs to pour a bowl of cereal as 
critical to his daily routine, signifying an emotional connection (Daddona, 2018). This campaign 
blew up into an iconic slogan that reverberated through pop culture, promoted by its numerous 
milk mustache commercials, especially ones featuring celebrities and cartoon characters. 
Milk has come under great scrutiny over the last decade as research began to uncover 
certain health risks of milk and the prevalence of lactose intolerance in the population was made 
more apparent. Iftikhar (2020) lists health benefits versus risks, with the risk column being just as 
lengthy as the benefits. Several alternatives to dairy milk were listed in this analysis, such as 
almond milk, oat milk, and, most important for the alt-right, soy milk. For the alt-right, milk has 
come to symbolize two things in response to the research of milk and the growing popularity of 
milk alternatives: hypermasculinity and racial superiority. But these associations with milk did not 
start with the alt-right and manosphere. Milk has long been associated with whiteness, from early 
colonization to the present day. 
Dupuis (2006) argues that the pressure on agricultural societies to produce “pure” milk 
actually resulted in a gatekeeping of material resources, the need to exclude racialized others in 
order to preserve its purity, even with milk production in colonized African countries like 
Zimbabwe (Hove & Swart, 2019). Gambert (2019) further elucidated that government officials 
and nutrition organizations throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries constantly linked 
milk as a “perfect, white drink” that provided Anglo-Saxons the necessary strength to build civil 
society. Pamphlets circulated by the U.S. National Dairy Council in the 1920s even stated that the 
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people that consumed lots of milk were the people who built civil society, those people being white 
(Gambert, 2019). The color of milk has also contributed to this association between milk and white 
supremacy, with descriptions of racial diversity measured by things like milk in coffee metaphors 
(Cornwell, 2011) and praises of the whiteness of milk as attributable to its goodness (Gambert, 
2019). In order to understand how milk has developed its most recent connotations surrounding 
white supremacy and masculinity, it is important to understand the vehicle for that appropriation 
in the context of the alt-right, culture jamming.  
Culture Jamming  
Lasn (1999) describes culture jamming in a comprehensive fashion in her book Culture 
Jam, specifically from an anti-corporatist perspective. Culture jamming is the art of disrupting 
dominant ideology through a satirical depiction of it using its own structures or icons, a practice 
that Lasn (1999) identifies as a way to promote a consciousness about manipulation by 
corporations that consumers experience. Lasn (1999) describes culture jammers as “shock 
troopers” that are on the front lines of resisting the colonization of our minds by a variety of social 
forces. Lasn (1999) specifically describes culture jamming in the context of 90s American 
consumer culture, where corporate branding and the personification of brands took center stage. 
Economic prosperity brought with it high rates of personal connection to capitalism and what Lasn 
(1999) describes as an “ecology of mind” where rates of mental illness were on the rise (a story 
that is even more true today). These social conditions are, thus, the motivation to fight, the injustice 
to correct.  
The ways in which culture jammers reject and challenge these dominant ideologies are 
numerous. The most classic example that Lasn (1999) uses is how ad jammers re-appropriated 
companies’ advertising to level criticism at them. For instance, Ron English produced 
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advertisements “for” tobacco companies that exposed the darker sides of their business models, by 
having a deceased body overlaid by the logo for the cigarette brand, Kool, and an ad for Camel 
cigarettes having “kids” written under it in colorful letters (Klein, 2009). These parodies take 
advantage of the existing corporate branding in order to engage in what Lekakis (2017) calls 
excorporation, “when activists use the logic of appropriation to carve new meaning out of the 
resources available.” Harzman (2015) states that culture jamming achieves its goal of subversion 
through three processes: Artifact, distortion, and awareness. First, culture jamming, as a practice, 
necessitates the existence of an artifact to parody/satirize and subvert meaning for. Second, the 
rhetor draws on the elements present within the existing symbol to distort the message and create 
new, critical meaning. Third, an alternative awareness is created in the audience of the original 
message, hopefully for culture jammers, one that is negative. 
Much of the research on culture jamming is associated with anti-corporatism (Harold, 
2007; Harzman, 2015; Klein, 2009; Lasn, 1999; & Wettergren, 2009) or understanding culture 
jamming as praxis (Harold, 2004; Milstein & Pulos, 2015). These traditions of culture jamming 
focus mostly on movements on the left. Historically, this kind of transgressive political praxis once 
characterized left-wing movements in the mid-20th century, from anti-war activists to feminists. 
Strikingly missing from the literature on culture jamming is its use by online rightwing movements 
whose dominant praxis is taking what is considered sacred or devoid of substantive meaning and 
twisting it. For the members of the alt-right, political correctness and “wokeness” are not only the 
perfect targets for satire, but they are necessarily enemies of their transgressive spaces. 
Lasn (1999) states that culture jamming is not an isolated practice, but rather, it is a practice 
with a philosophical history in resistance movements. To understand the purpose of culture 
jamming, understanding the two philosophical underpinnings of this theory and praxis is 
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necessary, situationism and detournement. Situationism is the belief that life can be lived in two 
ways, one that is normal and expected under dominant social structures and one that is exploratory 
and daring, a genuine expression of human rebellion (Lasn, 1999). An example of situationism can 
be the difference between performing the gender identity a person is assigned at birth versus 
resisting the values of gender expression externally placed on them to discover their own unique 
gender expression. Hannah Arendt and Albert Camus recognize the danger of ideology and 
absolute structures of thought, and for them, the very practice of politics requires a rejection of 
absolute truth and an acceptance of an absurd world that is not strictly confined to human 
constructed ideology or structures (Isaac, 1992). Situationism operates as a rejection of 
essentialism, the argument that there are definable and essential natures of humanity that we can 
accurately represent and understand. The symbolic nature of our material world leaves open 
possibilities for subversion that people often take advantage of.  
While situationism is a philosophy of the ways in which we live and organize our lives, 
detournement is defined as “rerouting spectacular images, environments, ambiences and events to 
reverse or subvert their meaning, thus reclaiming them,” (Lasn, 1999). Detournement takes the 
rejection of normative structures and uses performance to redefine those structures, whether it is 
Berkley students occupying their campus as a way of protesting university bureaucracy (Landau, 
2008) or protestors taking the language given to them by their leader and turning that language 
into graffiti and internet memes (Kiziltunali, 2020). Detournement’s obsession with material 
rhetoric, a way of transforming our material reality into a statement or judgment of that reality, is 
inherently rebellious. By subverting the sanctity of spaces and symbols of power in a material 
fashion, the individual empowers themselves by showing the world that the powerful are not 
inherently powerful, that they derive power from our acknowledgment. By subverting that 
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acknowledgment, protestors, from Occupy Wall Street to the hacker collective, Anonymous, 
subvert structures of power. Both elements of situationism and detournement are present in culture 
jamming that Lasn (1999) describes as both a way to view and understand one’s position in the 
world and do something about it. 
In its most basic form, culture jamming is the appropriation of symbols as a means of 
disrupting narrative and power structures. This praxis is effective due to the enduring power of 
symbolisms on our collective social mindset. Lasn (1999) talks about “memes” as a source of 
power in cultural conflict. While memes at the time this theoretical text was written had a different 
meaning, being more closely aligned with Dawkin’s original conception of memes as a unit of 
cultural information (Shifman, 2014), the essential principle of memes that Lasn (1999) discusses 
still very much relate to the production, replication, and distribution of cultural information on the 
internet. This essential principle lies in the normalizing power of memes, that Lasn (1999) 
describes as the ability of “a catchphrase, a concept, a tune, a notion of fashion, philosophy, or 
politics” to “leap from brain to brain to brain.” Lasn (1999) states that while protests and direct 
forms of disruptive action can be influential to a degree, the real change is when cultural symbols 
and their meanings are taken and transformed to shape the way that people think about the world. 
Essentially, “whoever has the memes has the power,” (Lasn, 1999). In the context of the internet, 
symbolism is constantly appropriated, and memes have become the language of the modern 
internet, where many jokes online are context-dependent, requiring a prior knowledge of the 
history of certain concepts, media, and other internet memes to find humor and solidarity. 
The character of the culture jammer is also noteworthy. Lasn (1999) describes the culture 
jammer as motivated by rage, which is argued to be a good thing, a force of emotion that can be 
harnessed to affect revolutionary change. For Lasn (1999), the culture jammer not only must 
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harness rage and revolutionary purpose, but the culture jammer must also be confrontational, 
unafraid of shedding the façade of politeness in activism, and insistent on maintaining sovereignty 
and integrity. This attitudinal position places the culture jammer as a necessarily aggressive actor, 
one that requires anger and a direction to channel it in order to achieve its goals of subversion.  
I argue that while culture jamming presents many benefits to change makers looking to 
reform the social order to be more equitable and freer of manipulation by consumer driven markets, 
there is also darker legacy to this practice that we have seen develop over the last few decades with 
the internet becoming our primary location of politics and culture. My contribution to this field of 
research is understanding that culture jamming does not just belong to the left, but that it is now 
also used by extreme rightwing forces to disrupt or “culture jam” social progress and cultural 
liberalism. Milk and its scientific and cultural history served as the venue for alt-right ideology to 
both reappropriate milk’s symbolism and level a criticism surrounding multiculturalism and 
masculinity. 
Culture jamming, in its parodic capacity, is meant to reveal the practices that organizations 
and societal forces would rather stay quiet (Harold, 2007). Through this exposure of the 
inconsistencies and absurdities of prevailing structures, the culture jammer taps into an affective 
element, drawing from existing feelings and emotional dispositions present within the system. For 
instance, Wettergren (2009) highlights the affective character of culture jamming in the context of 
late-stage capitalism, where much of our emotional state is tied to the conditioning and mentally 
colonizing force of consumerism that we experience under capitalism. Culture jamming allows for 
a disruption of these normative spaces by not only exposing inconsistent practices but operating 
as a liberatory emotional space for the culture jammers themselves and those who consume their 
messages. Wettergren (2009) characterizes the emotional liberation of “fun and laughter” in 
28 
 
culture jamming as an expression of real emotion, a “utopian laughter” that rebukes the colonized 
affective order. Humor, specifically satire, operates as one of the most prominent pillars of culture 
jamming praxis.  
Satire is the process by which the elements of a created work are used to either subvert 
expectations or level criticism toward an institution, while a parody entails an imitation to level 
criticism at the original work. Culture jamming can be either parody or satire, taking the template 
of an institution and/or ideology and using it as commentary either about the entity the message 
came from or about society writ large. Satire relies on the intertextuality of artifacts that build 
meaning over one another (Betruccelli Papi, 2019). Fichman and Dainas (2019) characterize 
trolling, the quintessential practice of those in the alt-right, as having satirical capacity, and in this 
satirical capacity, trolling even takes the subjects and institutions that we hold as sacred or 
normative and twists them to subvert their power. While satire is the structure of humor inherent 
to culture jamming, the form of humor being deployed in milk appropriation is superiority humor. 
Superiority Humor 
 While the argument that white nationalists make with the symbolism of milk is dark and 
horridly offensive, the way they present their argument is intended to be humorous. Specifically, 
the culture of the alt-right often takes these serious and dangerous belief systems, transforming 
them into jokes that allow for a certain level of plausible deniability (DeCook, 2020). This type of 
joking is nothing new. Racial disparagement and sexism in humor is an incredibly effective tool 
of socializing individuals to believing negative stereotypes about others, whether they are Polish 
jokes (Barrick, 1997), jokes about black people and immigrants (Billig, 2001; Malmqvist, 2015), 
or jokes disparaging women (Parrot & Hopp, 2020). By making a joke at another’s expense, their 
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dehumanization is presented more lightheartedly. This highlights how impactful humor is as a 
sociological force. 
 Humor fulfills a variety of social functions, one of which we have seen is the process of 
differentiation, using laughter to reinforce social norms by connecting to those who think or look 
the same way that we do and marginalize those that do not resemble us. This explanation of humor 
is known as the superiority theory of humor (Meyer, 2000). Essentially, superiority humor theory 
outlines an argument that, due to our cognitive need to reinforce social norms, there are people 
who laugh and people who are laughed at. In this way, superiority humor utilizes the power of 
humor as a means of social cohesion and identification (Meyer, 2000), and this delineation 
between who and, what we laugh at creates power inequality. But this marginalization is done with 
a laugh and a smile and dismissed, just like when Billig (2001) highlights how superiority humor 
is utilized by the Ku Klux Klan, who, among other hate groups, utilize superiority humor to 
perpetuate their ideology and provide themselves plausible deniability.   
 Language is the primary mechanism upon which ideology is built. Jokes and humor are a 
form of language where social norms and reality are negotiated, replicated, and distributed 
(Salamon, 2007; Shifman & Lemish, 2011), and with ideology being the sum of a variety of social 
practices and beliefs (Morgan, 2018), one of humor’s primary functions is engendering ideology.  
Meyer (1990) observes that humor is utilized by politicians not only for the functional aspect of 
relating to their audiences but also as a means of giving themselves and their ideas credibility. In 
facilitating that identification, audiences identify not only with the person or group of people 
utilizing humor but with the ideas and sentiments attached to those jokesters. This identification is 
constructed through a process of intertextuality. 
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Understanding humor is also contingent on prior knowledge of those hearing or 
participating in the joke, relying on intertextuality, or the comprehensive understanding of the 
various “texts” that are interwoven (Tsakona, 2018). Some jokes have meaning that can relate to 
most people, such as knock-knock jokes, but others, such as political satire and internet memes, 
require a higher level of “in-group” knowledge. This aspect of humor provides it with unique social 
properties whose ramifications are wide-ranging, especially in the realm of superiority humor. In-
group and out-group qualities of humor also apply to ideology, where members of one ideological 
group are more likely to cooperate with and relate to those in the same group (Balliet et al., 2018). 
Mason (2018) highlights this division, where not only is there massive disagreement between 
people of different identities but animosity toward one another. In 2021, we have seen the outbreak 
of political violence during the January 6 Insurrection, where in-group and out-group mentalities 
were taken to the extreme. While humor seems much less dire, the segmenting effects and reliance 
on intertextuality make humor a venue for generating biases about other people, and this is 
especially enabled with superiority humor. Different forms of humor and laughter have also 
brought with them different functional and ideological textures. At a biological level, Darwin 
(1872) identified laughter as a prosocial mechanism in mammals that indicates pleasurable 
meetings, social bonding, and social chastisement. Beyond biological function, cultural and social 
connotations become attached to humor and laughter. For example, Kjeldgaard-Christiansen 
(2018) identifies “evil laughter” as a way to inform those hearing it that the person or group 
laughing is inverting the pro-social nature of laughter. This inversion characterizes the ones 
laughing as devoid of human empathy, as antisocial beings. The ideological implication here is the 
vilification of the person or group that performs the “evil laugh.” Once this trope is utilized 
throughout popular media as a way to point villains out to the audience, these villains oftentimes 
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not only express the evil laugh but are often racialized. This can be seen in the case of many Disney 
and Pixar films such as Jafar from Aladdin and Scar in The Lion King that are either represented 
or coded as darker skinned Arab villains associated with Orientalism (Lugo-Lugo & Bloodsworth-
Lugo, 2009), in order to tie villainous texture to identifying characteristics of specific racial groups. 
This portrayal of the evil laugh both draws from and reinforces existing stereotypes, but more 
consequential for this analysis, humor and laughter can signal ideological meaning in ways such 
as this. 
Not only is the way that characters and people laugh imbued with value but also how 
humorous content is structured can indicate certain values. Gal (2019) identifies the participatory 
nature of humor on social media as boundary work, arguing that in these spaces, individuals and 
groups are setting and reinforcing social boundaries whenever they share or produce humorous 
content online. So sharing a pro-Trump or anti-Trump meme, for instance, creates and/or 
reinforces boundaries for political expression in certain digital social spaces. The existence of 
online racist humor is often thought of as aberrational and a problem of anonymity, that these sick 
individuals are engaging in unrestrained racial epithets despite mainstream morality (Malmqvist, 
2015). While that undeniably happens on the internet, often both humor and the participatory 
nature of online communities provides the gateway for racist rhetoric to be deployed in an 
organized but indirect fashion (Topinka, 2018). As discussed earlier, there is a level of cover that 
facilitating ideology through humor affords. Billig (2001) highlights that even the KKK, in their 
hateful humor, covers themselves by claiming that they are “just joking.” On digital platforms, 
these types of abusive humor become even more elusive due to the algorithmic structure of social 
media sites that reward highly engaged content, which often tends to be controversial and bigoted 
content (Matamoros-Fernández, 2017). Consequentially, humor that draws both people that agree 
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and disagree with the premise of an offensive joke tends to be some of the most visible content on 
social media. With greater visibility, the distribution of these forms and styles of superiority humor 
become easier. Hoedemaekers (2011) even asserts that the offensiveness of a joke is a strength of 
offensive humor because it exposes the fragile sanctity of social morals and norms by creating a 
space where laughter can be permitted in cases typically prohibited by said morals and norms. This 
is apparent in the success of notoriously offensive comedy, whether it is the success of television 
shows like South Park and Family Guy or comedians such as Kat Williams and Dane Cook.  
Furthermore, ironic humor, a prevalent form of humor and one that is frequently used by 
various digital social movements, creates an in-group network of those who get the joke. Those 
that do not “properly decode the message in such cases hold great potential for face damage, 
turning the failed addressee into the butt of the joke, and providing the addressor (and her 
successful addressees) with a sense of superiority,” (Gal, 2019). The creation of in-groups and out-
groups is the most important feature of superiority humor (Meyer, 2000), where “sides” are 
constructed to indicate a moral versus immoral group. In its most extreme form, humor often 
galvanizes political animus toward people of different ideologies and political parties (Alzouma, 
2019). Woods & Hahner (2019) characterize the political rise of Donald Trump as relying on the 
trolling and vilification of political opposition, such as how Hillary Clinton and Nancy Pelosi were 
personally attacked and made fun of as a way of cultivating both opposition to liberalism and 
congregation around a brand of social conservatism. By highlighting differences with others and 
making those differences a matter of ridicule and laughter, values are implicitly or explicitly stated 
and reinforced, constituting the ideology of the group laughing. Superiority humor operates as a 
means of taking power, where the construction of a superior position that is reinforced through 
mocking an opposing ideology, group, or individual provides the individual telling/agreeing with 
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the joke more relational power (Vallade et al., 2013). If enough people laugh at a stereotype and/or 
joke, then that joke becomes the dominant ideology that operates to marginalize and withhold 
power from the groups of people who are being laughed at or are left out of the joke (Malmqvist, 
2015).  
These ideologies constructed by superiority humor do not exist in isolation. Backlash to 
racist and sexist humor occur all the time. Bressler (2018), utilizing the superiority humor 
framework, identifies two types of humor: women’s humor and feminist humor. Women’s humor 
falls into traditional structures of power that have women telling jokes that perpetuate negative 
stereotypes about women being “air-headed” and materially obsessed. Feminist humor, on the 
other hand, formed as a backlash to negative stereotypes and jokes leveled toward women, 
functioning to point out the ludicrous nature of stereotypes and those that perpetuate them 
(Bressler, 2018). Humor can even be utilized as a tool of accountability and vigilance. Dynel 
(2020) conducted an analysis of a board on Reddit called r/IncelTears that aims to poke fun at 
incels, short for “involuntary celibates,” who are men on the internet that direct their grievances 
about their celibacy at women, who they claim hold all of the power in society. These groups often 
engage in violent speech about women, and this violent speech has even resulted in mass violence, 
as in the case of Elliot Rodgers who killed seven sorority women in 2014 (Nagourney et al., 2014). 
On this forum, Dynel (2020) argues that users engage in “vigilante humor” where they not only 
deride incels to differentiate themselves, but also hold those comments accountable and 
highlighting the dangerous nature of the incel community. In these ways, humor is a reactionary 
process that responds to the social conditions that people are experiencing. Superiority humor does 
not necessarily indicate that the person engaging in it objectively has more power. Rather, 
superiority humor is a comparative analysis of at least two groups, positions, and values where the 
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espouser of the joke is socially desirable, and the target of the joke is deemed socially undesirable. 
Once this form of humor is systemized, ideologies can be effectively disseminated through making 
the joke tellers fear the social consequences of becoming the joke.  
More recently, there has been massive pushback against “political correctness” and now 
“cancel culture” where standards of decency and the awareness surrounding how humor can be 
weaponized and harm people have come into focus. These rallying cries against political 
correctness celebrate a transgression of norms and decency standards, almost as if breaking them 
is revolutionary (Chow, 2016). This opposition to “political correctness” gave the right, especially 
the online right, the cultural framework it needed to gain influence in our cultural sphere (Woods 
& Hahner, 2019). Now, cancel culture has become the new buzz phrase of the political right, 
rallying against these standards of decency in a similar way that the crusade against political 
correctness had before. Kurtzleben (2021) claims that while these issues are of real concern in how 
we organize our society to make it more inclusive and observant of different points of view, these 
phrases are “easily weaponizable” to the point where the theme for CPAC, the annual conservative 
political conference attended by conservative politicians and activists, was “America 
Uncancelled,” (Montanaro, 2021). In this atmosphere, there exists fertile ground for the 
propagation of superiority humor, as there are many trolls that enjoy causing distress to others and 
to our social fabric, and there are people on the internet ready to engage trolls, unknowingly fueling 
their rhetorical mischief. 
Political Aestheticization & Trolling 
Politics is not just voting for the president every four years. Rather, political ideology lives 
and breathes through the lives of everyday people. People enact their political identity frequently, 
“from dumpster diving to skateboarding, from poetic manifestos to critical journalism, from an act 
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of assertion imposing your undesired presence near the subway station to growing kale on the 
sidewalk,” (Boudreau & Joëlle, forthcoming; Nadeau, 2019). With our performance and 
reinforcement of political identity occurring so frequently, ideology requires little consistency 
between social identity and policy preferences. Mason (2018) finds that our agreement with policy 
positions and what we label ourselves has a very weak positive relationship. In other words, social 
identification as a conservative or liberal is not bound by the nuances of policy, but rather, this 
political identification can be understood more like rooting for a football team. The reason to 
support and identify with a team is often a matter of loyalty and affective attachment. Affect is a 
key component of political identity, how one feels about themselves and their relationship to the 
outside world. Foucault (1992) describes political engagement as an “art of existence” in which 
people “not only set themselves rules of conduct, but seek to transform themselves, in their most 
singular being, and make their life into an oeuvre that carries certain values and meets certain 
stylistic criteria.” Essentially, political identity can be conceptualized as a web of interconnected 
performances, with each performance carrying symbolic value. Wearing a t-shirt branded with an 
anti-war logo is a political performance. Consciously making the effort to recycle is a political 
performance. Watching a movie about the Holocaust is a political performance. All of these 
activities, due to the justification provided for their value, create or reinforce worldviews that are 
the backbone of ideology.  
This performance of identity has very real emotional consequences for people in public 
discourse. Simchon et al. (2020) observe higher rates of depression among liberal voters when 
discussing the effects of the 2016 election, and Pfefferbaum et al. (2019) observed higher rates of 
anxiety and depression in youth who are exposed to political violence. Clearly, there is a level of 
emotional resonance that is attached to politics, and with Americans increasingly attaching their 
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affective identity with politics and social issues (Mason, 2018), the more volatile political 
discourse becomes. Nekmat & Ismail (2019) found evidence supporting the idea that the degree 
of someone’s expressive support for issue positions on social media (liking, commenting, and 
sharing) was positively correlated by their level of both opinion congruity, how much one feels as 
if their opinion is the same as the group they belong to, and their perceived efficacy of activism 
among their group. Both cognitive processes and metrics are distinctly social and emotional 
phenomena that centers group acceptance. 
For extreme political identities like the alt-right, political identification is also grounded in 
performance of that identity. Political identity becomes more than a vision of the future that you 
hope and work for. Political identity is the clothes associated with the ideology, the marches that 
you attend, and what social needs political engagement satisfies. Nadeau (2019) describes this 
process as the “aestheticization” of everyday life, where our bodies and their orientation in the 
world is the primary locus of politics. Struggle and social needs propel our political identity. For 
example, Frank Meeink, a former skinhead neo-Nazi who now leads anti-hate talks, described his 
experience to Jody Roy (Meeink & Roy, 2017) of feeling disempowered throughout his childhood 
and witnessing/experiencing violence. Meeink felt a sense of self, safety, and control once he 
joined his cousin’s band of neo-Nazis, translating feelings from his personal relationships into 
hardcore ideological devotion. This is mirrored in Nadeau’s (2019) interviews with skinhead right-
wing extremists in Ontario, who describe feelings of disempowerment throughout their lives and 
obtaining agency and purpose through joining white supremacist organizations. For them, this 
story of finding purpose is the aesthetic representation of their political belief, so whether it is 
marching in a parade or enacting violence against another person, this process of building political 
identity involves branding yourself with its symbolism, iconography, and language. 
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It is important to note that the study of political aesthetics extends beyond the scope of 
rightwing extremist movements, such as Nielsen’s (2017) analysis of the use of socialist 
revolutionary aesthetic being utilized by local community organizations in Mozambique after the 
dissolution of socialism as a national political system. While the tension of sacrificing socialist 
beliefs and leading revolution are present in these town meetings, the “revolutionary aesthetic” or 
the performance of socialist revolutionary politics remained and transformed in response to the 
needs of the communities and country. Political aesthetics are more than the feeling of being in a 
group meeting. This approach to political action philosophically functions as an endeavor of ego, 
of satisfying the need to represent an identity or cause. This can take the form of maneuvering 
politics (Nielsen, 2017) and even utilizing one’s own body to defiantly resist an authoritarian 
power (Ryan, 2019). For example, the famous 1989 Tienammen Square protest where an unnamed 
man stood before a tank operated as an aesthetic performance of political protest and identity. 
Political aesthetics is a total style of politics that intersects individual and group identity, where 
individual action represents collective identity.  
 Tapping into this emotion is a critical component of alt-right discourse. For instance, 
#whitegenocide is a rallying cry for members of the alt-right and white nationalists who perform 
their identities through what Deem (2019) calls “affective economies of transgression.” These 
affective economies of transgression, in this context, are the imagined spaces of whiteness 
constructed on the internet, where the pleasure of belonging to a group is bound with and even 
culminated through anxiety over the “imagined transgressions of racial outsiders” (Deem, 2019). 
Affect, or our set of outward emotional projections, is not only located within the individual, but 
it also operates as an “economy” of discourse where fear or pleasure “generates the surfaces of 
collective bodies,” (Ahmed, 2004). Essentially, a group’s collective emotional position resonates 
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to the individuals of that movement. Affect, and subsequently, the building of affective economies, 
depends on the performance of identity that people emotionally connect with. The alt-right has 
performed their identity through their use of symbols such as #whitegenocide (Deem, 2019), the 
O.K. sign (Swales, 2019), and, as I will show, milk. In order to understand how political aesthetic 
and the performance of political identity are as powerful as they are, it is important to understand 
this process in the context of the online and offline ecosystem of discourse that we inhabit.  
The affective way that people engage in politics has been referred to increasingly as 
“culture war.” Whitham (2018) describes a culture war as an integration of our personal private 
lives with our public political lives. This infusion of public and private has been accelerated by the 
rise of social media and has resulted in a politics where the praxis of enacting change is “telling 
off” of the other side. Adamson (2019) argues that this practice by both racists and anti-racists has 
accelerated right-wing nationalism by centering moral outrage at the political other in how we 
think about politics. Adamson (2019) further argues that the rise of right-wing populism can also 
be attributed to the political left’s lack of imagination concerning how people are socially and 
materially situated to identify with right-wing parties. Thus, both “ends” of the political spectrum 
tie their politics with an “emotionalism” where emotional vindication in one’s belief trumps all 
else. This politics of outrage is evident in our current political and socio-cultural landscape, as 
concerns surrounding “cancel culture,” political segmentation, and the rise of domestic terrorism 
have become prominent themes in the last few years. The January 6 Capitol Insurrection provides 
us the best contemporary example of how a politics of grievance is like a powder keg, where 
pressure is constantly being applied in most spaces, online and offline, until it explodes into these 
events of violence and destruction.  
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 This inclination toward outrage and conflict-oriented engagement provides fertile ground 
for right-wing trolls to prosper. As ideological divisions between people sharpen, right-wing trolls 
have the space to take advantage of people’s worst inclinations, especially on the internet, whose 
very structure enables and incentivizes negative behavior. Stuart and Scott (2021) found that the 
greater amount of time individuals spent online, the higher what they term the “Measure of Online 
Disinhibition,” essentially a scale that measures how likely someone on the internet is to not have 
the discipline or control to moderate their behavioral or cognitive responses, which resulted in 
more frequent positive (Self-disclosure online) and negative (cyberbullying, trolling, etc.) online 
behaviors. Even more concerning is that the experience of online abuse combined with these higher 
levels of online disinhibition has actually been found to coincide with an increase to perpetration 
of online hate (Wachs & Wright, 2019). This disinhibition has created a state of discourse 
vulnerable to actors with disruptive and transgressive intentions, utilizing the façade of the internet 
to carry out the kind of trolling endemic to the alt-right and manosphere. 
Ultimately, political aestheticization is a constitutive theory of how individuals perform 
ideology, and culture jamming provides a praxis for social action that realizes this performance 
through a re-appropriation of symbols that subvert institutions and actors (Lasn, 1999). As Lasn 
(1999) describes the revolutionary potential of culture jamming, the aesthetic of political action 
and rebellion is intricately woven into the practice. Lasn (1999) describes as a spirit of the anti-
establishment anger that creates a political identity determined to overturn the order of everyday 
life. For the alt-right, the kind of culture jamming that can disrupt a system and establish an 
affective connection to the alt-right’s philosophy is trolling. 
The ideology of the alt-right is often enacted and even defined through a tradition of online 
trolling, a range of behaviors from being intentionally offensive to leaving a disingenuous 
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comment in order to experience the thrill of getting a rise out of another person. What makes this 
practice so effective is that it simultaneously spreads the ideology but does so in such a ridiculous 
way that members of the group have plausible deniability of the sincerity of those beliefs. Trolling 
is such an effective vehicle for delivering the message of the alt-right because of its prankster 
tradition, allowing their ideas to ferment but fly under the radar as people dismiss them and their 
influence (Romano, 2017a). This same dismissal is what allowed Spencer access to university 
spaces where his ideas could be legitimized by having access to normative intellectual spaces, or 
spaces that enjoy public legitimacy, essentially contributing to normalizing alt-right ideology 
(Ramasubramanian & Miles, 2018). Marantz (2019) even argues that by broadcasting Spencer’s 
speech at his think tank’s conference after the 2016 Presidential Election, where he states “Hail 
Trump! Hail our people! Hail victory!” that is reminiscent of the Nazi salute “Sieg Heil,” there is 
a level of popularity and normalization that was given to the alt-right in the mainstream media. 
Spencer’s message would arguably have not gotten the traction that it had without the nature of 
contemporary internet discourse to spread and promote these divisive ideas. 
Trolling is a deception of pleasure, one that gives the deceiver a sense of joy or 
entertainment at the expense of the deceived target (Dynel, 2016). Trolling takes many different 
overlapping forms that include posing as someone in need of help, taking controversial stances on 
issues, being overly insensitive about a topic, and making situations intentionally more aggressive 
(Hardaker, 2013). Dynel (2016) posits that the internet has uniquely allowed for trolling to be a 
more common phenomenon because of how easily manipulated our online personas are. 
Anonymous disinhibition, our tendency to act impulsively in online spaces due to the lack of 
personal and social consequences, provides the gateway for trolling to flourish online, giving trolls 
not only the architecture to exist, but an active incentive to do what they love (Dynel, 2016). 
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Davisson and Donovan (2019) state that trolling is a means of subversion that intends to disrupt 
normative spaces, much in the same way that culture jammers do. Typically, trolling relies on a 
distributive model of action, known as a participatory culture, where individuals act together for 
their own entertainment (Bowen, 2020). As a means of entertainment, Bowen (2020) goes further 
to explain that participatory culture encourages the creation and recreation of new content but that 
it does not require everybody to contribute.  
Trolling, though, is not strictly in the realm of the alt-right. Davisson and Donovan (2019) 
explore how John Oliver, the host of Last Week Tonight, regularly uses trolling to expose the 
fragility or abuses that occur within institutions. Pyo (2020) even highlights how young liberals in 
South Korea have taken to trolling as a means of having their voices and concerns heard, taking a 
practice that, on the surface, just seems like a way to have some antagonistic fun on the internet, 
and weaponizing it to place pressure on those in positions of authority. It is doubtful that the 
organizing forces of the internet really can inspire massive change through reputational damage 
(Banerjee & Case, 2020), but there are plenty of examples of participatory internet culture leading 
to the long-term rise of many social movements that have produced tangible changes, from fighting 
for Catalan independence to the prankster action of Anonymous (Anderson, 2019; Beyer, 2014; 
Odou et al., 2018). Trolling, and the larger sentiment of subversion permeate everything on the 
internet from getting into an argument with someone on Facebook to the hacktivist circles where 
people on the internet with rudimentary to advanced hacking capabilities use those skills to disrupt 
online spaces (Klein, 2015).  
Trolling, in the ways this section outlines, reaches into argument, form, praxis, and attitude 
in building what I will call “The Troll Ethos.” Many of those who participate in the alt-right may 
not even adhere to most or all of the ideology but are representing the ideology to subvert 
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normative systems, an ideology that I will interrogate in the subsequent chapters through my 
methodology of ideological criticism, where I will not only describe the ideology of the groups 
under analysis in this project but also the ideological consequences of their methods of resistance 






Chapter 3: Methodology & Case Studies 
Ideological Criticism 
 Milk’s storied history of cultural significance, symbolism, and now reappropriation 
warrant understanding, especially in the context of its use by the alt-right. Milk has the potential 
to operate as a conduit into the psyche of the alt-right and white nationalists who have embraced 
the symbol. As discussed earlier, their propensity for trolling and intentional acts of transgression 
are exemplified through their use of milk in online forums and protests. In order to understand how 
milk is related to and demonstrates alt-right ideology, I will be utilizing ideological criticism. 
Ideology is not just something that a person or group believes. Ideology is a way of seeing the 
world, of making decisions that matter, of binding people together or driving them apart. Ideology 
can be thought of from the perspective of religion, strong in its convictions about reality and the 
truth of the world, and this can plainly be seen in the rise of figures such as Rousseau, Hegel, and 
Marx whose philosophical writings surrounding philosophy and history came about after the 
emergence of Enlightenment scientific and political theory and the lowering of religion in the 
centrality of people’s understanding of the natural world (Niemeyer, 1992). Liberalism is an 
ideology. Nationalism is an ideology. Black Lives Matter is an ideology.  
 Ideology is ubiquitous, whether it be the spreading of political ideology (Pavel, 2019), 
attitudes surrounding language (Diaz & Hall, 2020; Lo Bianco, 2020), or even diaper commercials 
(Wells, 2016). For Slavoj Žižek, reality and ideology are linked to one another because “reality 
itself, mediated in and through socio-symbolic systems of order and meaning, is constituted by  
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ideology,” (Morgan, 2018). In this description of ideology, the symbols and language that we use 
build our understanding of reality, and these frames are socially constructed. For example, the 
Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis claims that people who speak different languages actually perceive the 
world differently because of the different language structures. This can look like cultures with 
heavy gendered language reinforcing gender norms more or how color is perceived differently 
based on the variety of shades recognized by the dominant language (Lucy, 2001).  
The acknowledgement of ideology as a human construct makes revolutionary thought and 
action more attainable, and it also highlights how power constrains and maintains itself, by 
controlling not only physical resources but also by establishing the guard rails that guide and limit 
our reality. Those that control the norms of language and symbols have the power to shape 
collective identity and establish an ideology. Thus, ideological criticism is not only a form of 
rhetorical criticism but of understanding how power is constructed. 
Foss (2018) outlines four steps to ideological criticism. The first step is identifying the 
presented elements in the artifact, which concerns locating basic and observable features of the 
artifact. Second, suggested elements are identified, which are the unspoken features of the text that 
connect to the more obvious elements. Third, from these suggested elements that will serve as 
ideological tenets, I will formulate an ideology from them, identify unifying values and truths 
signified by the texts’ messages. The final and most pivotal point of analysis for this paper will 
concern identifying the functions served by the ideology. It is not enough to understand what milk 
means in the context of the alt-right. Understanding why and how milk appropriation by the alt-
right perpetuated certain alt-right dialogic tendencies and behaviors provides a richer and more 
useful analysis.  
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 Ideology has always been the focal point for movements of the far right, from Nazism to 
white nationalism. Ulver and Laurell (2020) identify a type of consumer activism called antiliberal 
consumer activism, which is defined as the use of anti-liberal sentiment by hyper-conservative 
activists to protest ads that embody or hint at multiculturalism. Ideology is the glue that holds these 
individuals’ aspirations together. This ideological frame imagines the cultural left as an invasive 
and villainous group of people that are intending to “destroy culture.” Thus, ideological criticism 
focuses on exposing ways that ideologies color our perspective of the world. For instance, Piper 
and Meyer (2020) utilized ideological criticism in their analysis of the TV series Fixer Upper. 
Here, they argue that the show’s narrative surrounds an average couple that aims to fix up people’s 
homes, with the assumption that doing so can elevate any person’s social and economic class. The 
ideology represented here is one of economic mobility, the belief that with enough gumption and 
hard work, class structures and obstacles can be transcended. When it comes to symbolic 
communication, ideological criticism provides a method that can parse out how symbols form and 
represent ideologies. Ideological criticism not only aims to expose an ideology, but it also 
examines the functions that ideology serves in a given context. The alt-right, founded as an 
alternative political ideology, constructs it as an ideology of resistance. This understanding of the 
alt-right as an ideology of resistance illuminates a number of functions that the alt-right’s 
appropriation of milk serves, but the following functions are ones that my analysis will focus on: 
a praxis for resistance, the form that resistance takes, and the goals of that resistance. 
 Engaging in ideological criticism is not just an academic activity but a political one as well. 
Andersen (1993) explains that ideological criticism is inherently tied to social and political 
activism because at its most basic level, “a discussion of ideology, politics, or power” initiates an 
ideological action, the creation of new analysis and understanding of an ideology that exerts power 
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and influence. Ideology encapsulates even actions such as paying taxes that we consider politically 
neutral, and even our musing about ideology, whether in academic writing or popular culture, leads 
to further actions both intellectual and material (Andersen, 1993).   
Methods 
In order to uncover the significance of milk symbolism for the alt-right and manosphere, I 
will examine four different case studies surrounding milk in the context of the alt-right: the protest 
of Shia LeBeouf’s “He Will Not Divide Us” art exhibit denouncing Donald Trump, the original 
“Enter the Milk Zone” 4chan post on the Politically Incorrect board; the use of milk by famous 
white nationalist, Richard Spencer, on Twitter; and the video, “SOYBOYS”, by famous Youtuber, 
PewdiePie. Each of these texts represent different but connected uses of milk in the alt-right and 
manosphere; thus it allows for a unified analysis of this appropriation of milk. After fully 
describing the case studies, I will move into three analysis chapters, focusing on different theories 
presented in the literature review, all contributing to the formation of alt-right ideology, with 
culture jamming operating as a primary guiding theory for each chapter of analysis. As I will argue, 
culture jamming operates as the praxis for resistance and appropriation, superiority humor is the 
form that resistance models itself after, and the establishment of a political aesthetic is the goal of 
resistance.  
The first artifact under analysis is the 4chan thread that coined the phrase “Enter the Milk 
Zone,” (Anonymous, 2017). The main claim in this 4chan thread comes from a report published 
by Leonardi et al. (2012) showing that only 1/3 of the global population is lactose tolerant. A large 
portion of the lactose tolerance was concentrated in the part of the world that many on the alt-right 
herald as the origins of Western, Anglo-Saxon, and Nordic greatness. An infographic based on this 
report was produced by Ferro (2013) at Popular Science that designates these lactose tolerance 
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areas as the Milk Zone. This infographic was posted on 4chan, specifically to the board Politically 
Incorrect, or /pol/ for short (Anonymous, 2017). This board is dedicated to being as politically 
insensitive as possible, oftentimes attracting white supremacists and other political extremist trolls. 
The post was titled “Enter the Milk Zone,” a play on the Milk Zone designated by Ferro (2013). 
In this thread, the posters celebrated European heritage and derided people who talked about their 
lactose intolerance, insinuating that such a trait makes them racially inferior. One user posted a 
picture of the gang from A Clockwork Orange sitting against the wall with milk in their hands, 
and the text accompanying the image states, “Droogies reporting in,” droogie being a slang term 
in A Clockwork Orange for ultra-violent gang members. When another user said that drinking 
plain milk triggers their gag reflex, that they are “the whitest 1% of the population,” and that they 
can only drink chocolate milk, another user replied to them with a picture of a black man holding 
a bottle of chocolate milk with the text “Whatever you say Jamal.” The insinuation here is that 
because the original poster (or OP for short) only drinks chocolate milk, then OP cannot truly be 
a white person. There are many similar racial epithets and stereotypes that pepper this forum. 
Along with racist musings, there are some in the thread aiming to contest the truthfulness of this 
claim, only to be rebuked by trolls hurling insults at them.  
The protest of Shia LeBouf’s He Will Not Divide Us exhibit features young, white, and 
shirtless men that are holding milk jugs and yelling either white supremacist rhetoric or lingo from 
internet chat boards like 4chan and Reddit. This exhibit was set up with a camera on a wall with 
the words “he will not divide us” above it at the Museum of Moving Images. This camera fed to a 
livestream on the website. The purpose of this livestream was for people to congregate and display 
love for one another, but a group of trolls from the website 4chan organized a meet up in front of 
the camera after dark to chug milk without shirts on to signal their belief in white supremacy 
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(O’Neal, 2017). They jovially chugged milk, yelled coded 4chan lingo, and playfully flexed their 
muscles. Some quotes from the video include (Tekajin, 2017): 
“Look at these ripped abs!” (gesturing to man lifting up his shirt) “This is masculine 
perfection!” 
“If you don’t drink a gallon of this a day, you are leaving gains on the table.” 
“This is how the Viking conquered Europe!” 
“A nice cold glass of pure racism. Get it down here.” 
The group was comprised of six to eight men on camera shirtless at any given time, with a group 
of twenty or so others watching the spectacle, with people coming and going during the duration 
of the performance. Throughout the video, they would spontaneously yell, lift each other off of the 
ground, and yell about milk making them strong and manly. Also present during this protest was 
an almost celebratory spirit, with many of them laughing and joking with one another for the 
duration, all with the goal of sabotaging the art project. This sabotage ended up being successful 
as the Museum of Moving Images shut down the project, which was moved a few more times due 
to this coordinated trolling effort by users from 4chan (Mumford, 2017; O’Neal, 2017). The 
footage used for this analysis was uploaded by Youtube user Tekajin (2017), who also uploaded 
other parts of the protest, but seeing as the other parts were either uneventful or repeated similar 
behaviors and statements, all relevant analysis for the present study was drawn from second part 
of their five video upload.  
The third case study under analysis is the Twitter biography of Richard Spencer in 2017 at 
the height of this appropriation of milk symbolism. As discussed before, Spencer was the 
originator of the term “alt-right,” so his usage of milk in his Twitter bio represents an 
acknowledgment of this appropriation by a critical actor in the movement. In the profile, Spencer 
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has placed an emoji of milk between his first and last name, and the first line of his bio states “I’m 
very tolerant…lactose tolerant!” (Swerdloff, 2017). This is meant to evoke the irony that he is 
usually called a bigot and intolerant because many of his beliefs center around white nationalism.  
In order to examine how milk is used by the online right in derision of “soy boys,” I 
examine a video published by PewDiePie, a famous gaming Youtuber that has a current following 
of 109 million subscribers, entitled “S O Y B O Y S.” PewDiePie, whose real name is Felix 
Kjellberg, is a particularly interesting person for this study because he appeals to many adolescents 
and is very connected into this sphere of the online right because of his proximity to the gaming 
world. In Roose’s (2019) analysis of PewDiePie as a cultural figure, there is an acknowledgment 
that his popularity and place in internet culture is wrapped up in a brand of “edgelord” humor, 
humor that relies on the breaking of taboos and political correctness. This was especially revealed 
when he made anti-Semitic jokes and even said “death to all Jews” in a stream that he claimed was 
ironic humor (Romano, 2017b). This inclination by many in the gamer community that he was a 
part of bled into the broader alt-right and manosphere (Nagle, 2017).  
In this video, PewDiePie opens by playing videos of men talking about the benefits of 
soymilk and interrupting their monologues with a loud siren while he yells “SOYBOY!” In the 
video, PewDiePie spends most of the video insulting these archetypal “soy boys” by making fun 
of what are considered non-masculine behaviors. He points out that soy boys have apparent 
feminine characteristics such as getting overly excited and fawning over a gaming console, the 
Nintendo Switch, that he characterizes as a “kid’s console.” He further shares memes that insinuate 
soy boys are also cucks, men whose girlfriends sleep with other men, and how being a cuck is 
emasculating. He also makes the argument, very prominently, that consuming soy makes men 
weak, “like a woman.” (PewDiePie, 2018). Near the end of the video, he spends a minute admitting 
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that there is no scientific link between drinking soy and feminization, but this section is tinged 
with insincerity, with him even saying the following: 
“It’s just a meme that has spiraled out of control, and I feel like I have to be responsible 
here and call it out so that people stop using “soy boy” as some sort of insult. Because it’s 
not just mean, it’s also extremely hurtful. I just can’t understand why anyone would call 
someone else a soy boy to prove some fact that just because they are less a man and enjoy 
watching someone else have sex with their wife, that somehow makes them less,” 
(PewDiePie, 2018). 
In finishing this monologue, PewDiePie cracks up laughing and then returns to joking about soy 
boys and says that it is “all about the onion” and that onions make men produce testosterone, even 
taking the time to reference the DreamWorks movie Shrek, who is included in many memes in 
online communities. The entire video is tinged with these questions of sincerity on his part, 
whether he subscribes to the ideas of deriding feminine men as soy boys or if he really stands 
against it. This ambiguity serves to make it hard to decipher his real feelings on the matter. The 
video ends with a purple filter over a still image of PewDiePie, with the text “Don’t be soy. Be 












Chapter 4: Analysis – Culture Jamming the Left with White Supremacist & Masculine 
“Milk” 
 The way that milk is utilized by both the alt-right and manosphere is to signal aspects of 
group identity that they wish to communicate with others. Specifically, there are two dominant 
interpretation of milk’s significance in the alt-right, as a positive indicator of racial superiority and 
masculinity. While the expressions of milk as racial superiority and masculinity are based on two 
different arguments, they both signal an ideology based on transgression and opposition to cultural 
liberalism. 
Milk as White Supremacy 
 The way in which milk is utilized by white nationalists online is similar to the way in which 
medical research was manipulated to fit racial biases throughout the initial inception of 
institutional medical research (Painter, 2011). As discussed earlier, milk’s long history of 
representing a healthy and full diet was heavily baked into the structure of nutrition in the United 
States, and not without merit. While recent research has found negative effects of milk, there are 
still plenty of advantages for children that exist (Iftikhar, 2020), but lactose intolerance presents a 
minimal to severe barrier for many to access these benefits. And the findings surrounding the 
historical distribution of lactose tolerance combined with its symbolism of life and strength, along 
with the creepy connotations surrounding how milk is used as a device in movies to denote sinister 
individuals (Killingsworth, 2016) make it ripe for appropriation. This uncomfortable association 
of grown men drinking milk along with the already existing racialized texture of milk discussed 
52 
 
earlier gives these trolls a way to channel and express their ideology. Milk has the ability to 
perform white supremacy in the following ways: both appropriating innocuous cultural symbols 
and scientific posture. 
 As has been discussed, symbols carry significant power. They can help group members 
identify with one another. They can even stand in as arguments for a group of people. But hate 
symbols are presented with a unique challenge, how to signify their power but also not drive away 
sympathetic people who may or may not adhere to a white supremacist ideology. Kovaleski et al. 
(2016) argue that the hyper-villanization of the swastika has actually narrowed the conversation 
on white supremacist symbolism, so much so that the alt-right abandoned the swastika as a symbol 
and has adopted other lesser-known symbols like the pre-Roman Othala Rune used by Nazi 
Germany and the O.K. symbol (Willingham, 2019). This is an old tactic commonly used by hate 
groups. In appropriating innocuous cultural symbols, hate groups are able to connect their ideology 
to a wider and more mainstream set of cultural symbols. Milk operates under this objective but in 
a unique way. Unlike the Othala Rune and, to a degree, the O.K. sign, milk is an incredibly 
common beverage and presence in American and European life, with 21.2 million metric tons of 
fluid milk being consumed in the United States in 2020 (Shahbandeh, 2021). The common nature 
of milk makes this appropriation particularly troubling.  
 This appropriation of milk from the study surrounding lactose hotspots (Ferro, 2013) is 
reminiscent of the appropriation of evolutionary sciences to promote and justify white supremacy 
(Painter, 2011). Specifically, in the case of how the alt-right utilizes milk, they often talk about 
race and lactose tolerance in either quantified measurements or with a scientific ethos. In the “Enter 
the Milk Zone” 4chan thread (Anonymous, 2017), we can see examples of this presentation of 




Here, instead of just accepting a singular narrative, there is a back and forth of presenting evidence 
and making arguments about the racial composition of others. These types of interactions lend an 
air of normalization for white supremacist ideology. By linking scientific articles and using 
approximate percentages, this discussion of milk portrays racial animosity through the lens of 
pseudo-scientific reasoning, and I argue that this is endemic of the types of arguments utilized by 
the alt right.  
 Richard Spencer’s usage of milk in his profile signals a duality of vision between what 
milk came to represent and what Spencer represents. Richard Spencer was a new kind of white 
supremacist. His professional appearance and reasoning for his beliefs are carefully articulated, 
citing philosophers such as Friedrich Nietzsche and Carl Schmitt as inspirations for his belief in 
white nationalism (Wood, 2017). White supremacy with Spencer at the helm entered into a newer, 
more intellectual, yet also more playful age. Spencer picking up the milk symbolism and the 
accompanying words “I’m very tolerant... lactose tolerant,” makes sense when you look at his 
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belief system, that white people have unique cultural and genetic advantages. When placing 
Spencer’s belief system alongside this claim of lactose tolerance explaining cultural and genetic 
strength, the latter seems like evidence for the prior’s belief. This kind of confirmation bias is 
exactly what geneticists fear. In Harmon’s (2018) interviews with members of the American 
Society of Human Genetics, fears of misrepresentations of genetics research were expressed as a 
considerable risk. With studies that examine the relationships between ethnic background and 
disease predisposition or prediction of behaviors based on genetic background, the potential for 
misrepresentation by white supremacists is great. One of the common genetics arguments used by 
those in the alt-right is that because of the harsh winter conditions, northern Europeans developed 
to be genetically superior (Harmon, 2018). In these case studies, a scientific posture is combined 
with racist humor. 
Milk as masculine juxtaposition 
 Milk not only operates in online rightwing circles as a symbol for white supremacy, but it 
was also tied to a vision of masculinity due to two forces, transgressive politics and juxtaposition. 
First, milk is seen increasingly as not being as healthy as we previously thought in scientific 
consensus (Iftikhar, 2020). With the push toward veganism in popular media that expresses health 
and environmental concerns over factory farming and the popularity of meat alternatives, 
celebrating the consumption of animal products is thumbing one’s nose at what they perceive to 
be an “establishment opinion.” Nagle’s (2017) description of the alt-right’s engagement in 
“transgressive politics” applies here, where consuming meat becomes counter to what is seen as 
the popular cultural establishment that has distanced itself from meat consumption, just as 
masculinity is being critiqued in the culture wars. Holding on to animal product consumption, milk 
in this case, is a way to oppose both vegans and feminism, which are inextricably linked in the alt-
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right’s depiction of the cultural left (Gambert & Linne, 2018). Drinking milk is akin to fighting 
feminism.  
At first glance in the “Enter the Milk Zone,” the following reply to the thread may seem 
innocuous and off-topic, but it reveals another aspect of milk in the alt-right and manosphere: 
 
This reply features two older men bumping fists alongside the caption “Milk make man bigan 
strong / GOMAD today!” (Anonymous, 2017). GOMAD is a reference to the “Gallon of Milk a 
day” diet that prescribes drinking a gallon of milk per day for the purpose of building muscle 
(Bellati, 2018). Here and among other circles of the alt-right and manosphere, milk came to also 
encapsulate a parodic example of exaggerated masculinity, one whose expression and purpose is 
to troll feminists. Another reply on the post echoed a darker message:  
 
The picture posted on the reply is of the Droogs, a gang from the movie “A Clockwork Orange” 
led by main character, Alex DeLarge (Kubrick, 1972). In this particular scene, the camera shot 
starts at Alex’s face, deadpan and staring directly at the camera with an almost murderous intent. 
As the shot pans out, he and his fellow gang members are sipping on milk in a rooms filled with 
female mannequins set up either as tables or statues. This section of the movie is set to this group 
of men enacting random and indiscriminate violence upon others, including sexually assaulting 
women. In this reply, “droogies” or members of this gang are evoked and identified with. The 
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connection with the thread is their choice of beverage in this shot, milk. As discussed earlier, the 
thematic uses of milk in film when consumed by adults is to signal some oddity of behavior in the 
main character (Killingsworth, 2016), but this oddity, in the context of the alt-right, becomes an 
admirable trait of transgressive politics, of bucking “political correctness” for a freedom of 
thought. Milk transcends beliefs surrounding the strength producing aspects of milk and reaches 
into an emotional connection with violent ideation, especially in an anonymous environment where 
disinhibition is strong.  
Secondly, Anti-vegans not only tie the consumption of animal products to a brand of 
hegemonic masculinity, but Greenbaum & Dexter (2018) state that they also fuel the derision of 
vegan men as feminine and unworthy. This link is the original reasoning behind the term “soy 
boy” that serves as a juxtaposition between weak men and who the trolls of the manosphere believe 
themselves to be. In the “He Will Not Divide Us” protest, the group is joking around and flexing 
their muscles as they drink milk. At one point, one individual begins to sing a song that goes “I’m 
a lumberjack and that’s okay, and I drink my milk and I work all day!” which is immediately 
followed by someone saying, “down with the vegan agenda,” (Tekajin, 2017). There is a 
veneration of milk drinking as not only a masculine activity, but as a rallying cry for a masculinity 
that this group of trolls feels is under attack. Having to justify that being a lumberjack is okay 
implies that there is some sort of stigma attached to it. The argument, thus, is that milk is not only 
a masculine drink but one that represents a “marginalized way of life,” threatened by the presence 
of soymilk drinking men. This orients masculinity and those in the manosphere as the victims of 




In PewDiePie’s video, he first shows pictures of incredibly buff men talking about drinking 
soymilk, where he yells “soy boy” as an alarm is sounding in the background of the video, the 
humor here playing on the notions of soy boys and our traditional conceptions of masculinity. 
Then, into the video, PewDiePie begins showing both memes about soy boys and differentiating a 
“high testosterone” face with a “soy boy” face, which he describes as “balding or completely bald 
and an awkward smile.” He even describes soy boys as cucks, men who watch their partner 
engaging sexually with other men, as a way of deriding their sexuality. Ideologically, soy milk 
operates as the description of an undesirable position in life. Superiority humor works particularly 
well here because these attacks against soy boys are functionally differentiating “real” masculinity 
and the cultural tides that have been trying to escape traditional notions of masculinity. But 
upholding traditional masculinity is not the ultimate goal of this ideological appropriation of milk. 
There are many hyperbolic displays and assertions of masculinity made in these case 
studies. In the above example where the commenter stated “GOMAD,” the picture featured two 
older men in a pool, not the imagined peak of masculine strength. In PewDiePie’s (2018) video, 
he is what he often describes as “trolling” (DeCook, 2020) and not earnestly buying into this 
scientific myth of soy milk as a feminizing drink. And in the #HWNDU protest, the men there yell 
about how “If you can’t squat 315, then you’re worthless,” (Tekajin, 2017). While these are 
obviously exaggerated displays of masculinity, they still place masculinity and, more importantly, 
anti-feminism at the forefront of their messaging. This appropriation of milk to marginalize 
“feminine men” and, ultimately communicates the values of masculinity in online spaces 
populated by the alt-right. This highlights how appropriation makes more than a surface level 
claim. The appropriation of milk in these case studies points to the culture jamming potential of 
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milk appropriation, namely in how this application of new meaning is throwing a wrench into our 
cultural discourse surrounding social equity and hate movements. 
Applying New Meaning 
 These transformations of milk’s meaning do far more than just allow for the alt-right to 
traffic their ideology. Lasn (1999) describes culture jamming as a means of clogging a system with 
appropriated symbols. This intentional jamming, the wrench in the system, paves the way for 
alternative meaning to arise from the ashes of appropriation. As discussed previously, milk has 
had a myriad of meanings throughout our cultural history, from nutrition to life to infancy but in 
recent history, with a tinge of abnormality when grown men drink milk, the uncomfortable 
association between adulthood and infancy (Killingsworth, 2016). With all of these mixed 
associations, milk has inhabited a complicated symbolism. This ideological appropriation by the 
alt-right and manosphere adds to that complication in a very interesting way. Namely, this takeover 
of meaning accomplishes three goals: jams left-wing understanding of the alt-right, generates 
recognition power for the alt-right, and reinforces a mode of reasoning in the alt-right. 
 How political extremism is talked about is important. Often, our conversations surrounding 
rightwing extremism are overly simplified, where comparisons to Nazis are abundant in popular 
discourse. There is even a term known as Godwin’s Law that states that the bigger an internet 
comment section becomes, the greater likelihood that a comparison to Nazi Germany will occur, 
which is something that Michael Godwin himself finds problematic and unhelpful (Hoffman, 
2017). The oversimplification of the extreme political right makes our conversations surrounding 
how people are drawn into these movements simultaneously helpful and harmful, depending on 
how the conversations are framed. At their best, Holocaust comparisons can illuminate factors of 
social and political structures that can allow for people to be persecuted and harmed, much like 
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Snyder’s Black Earth: The Holocaust as History and Warning (2016). Outside of these rigorously 
researched texts, comparisons of the modern far right to Nazi Germany obscure the unique 
character and methods of modern political extremism, especially when it comes to social media 
and our digital environment. Even in these well-researched analyses, the ability to arrive at a well-
rounded understanding of fascism, political extremism, and our social and material conditions are 
dependent on special access to education and knowledge. Most people do not encounter these texts, 
though. Media is often the lens through which our understanding of social and political movements 
occur, and this appropriation of milk generated a fair bit of buzz in the media from editorials to 
talk show hosts (Gambert & Linne, 2018; Harmon, 2018; Holt, 2018; & Resnick, 2018). Through 
this appropriation, an additional complicated layer is added to the alt-right, and this unusual 
symbolism complicates people’s understanding of the alt-right. Whether this is intentional or not, 
the alt-right is shifting the conversation in a way that provides more exposure for their ideology. 
As Lasn (1999) explains, living in a media-saturated environment provides a unique power 
to memes, understood in her work as individual units of cultural information. These “memes” 
shape the very social reality that we inhabit. The interpretation of a particular cultural symbol 
means that the individual is framing their interpretation based on their own personal background, 
the groups that are associated with that symbol, the cultural values surrounding that symbol, and 
any number of other frames. For Lasn (1999), controlling these “memes” is a form of power and 
taking control of “memes” is thus a rebuke to the dominant institutions. By appropriating milk, the 
alt-right is taking over meaning as a means of resistance. For example, a protestor yelling “down 
with the vegan agenda,” (Tekajin, 2017) while chugging milk politicizes and assigns new meaning 
to milk consumption while also tying it to the historic antagonism against veganism. This hijacking 
of meaning and significance gave the alt-right a means of creating these associations that are not 
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just harmless fun. Through this re-appropriation, every day consumers of dairy milk are forced to 
confront whether or not they share a complicity in promoting a symbol of hate, or, even more 
consequentially, the alt-right now has symbolic claim to this food item that has such significance 
in American cultural life, from the importance of it in the Food Pyramid to the “Got Milk” 
campaign (Valenze, 2011). By stealing this symbol of nutrition and assigning an explicitly white 
supremacist and sexist definition to it, the alt-right is subverting the power that cultural liberalism 







Chapter 5: Analysis – Culture Jamming the Left through Superiority Humor 
 I argue that the use of milk by the online right is a culture jam that relies on humor. While 
I have explored what the alt-right and manosphere say with milk and how this is intended to jam 
our conversations surrounding equity, it is also important to understand how this message is 
effectively communicated and propagated. Considering that exclusion and marginalization are 
intrinsic properties of superiority humor, the presence of this humor in the alt-right and 
manosphere extends farther than milk. Milk provides a unique opportunity to analyze not only how 
superiority humor operates in content but also in style. I argue that the way milk was venerated 
among the alt-right and manosphere was intentionally humorous and functioned in the following 
ways: as a means of deflecting serious engagement and providing themselves plausible deniability. 
These functions of humor are integral to propagating the ideology of these digital spaces. By 
establishing how humor is weaponized and used to promote a nihilistic approach to political 
engagement, I can then construct and understand the heart of the ideology of the alt-right and 
manosphere. 
Superiority Humor in the Alt-right 
 As Meyer (2000) outlined, superiority humor is a type of humor that not only positions one 
group as superior and one group as inferior, but superiority humor also provides a group the means 
to differentiate between values that are good and bad. In the alt-right, the way in which milk 
appropriation is performed is through a humorous lens that aims to place whiteness and 
masculinity as superior qualities. In this analysis, I have discussed how milk has been used to 
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symbolize the beliefs of the alt-right, but how is this appropriation used as a joke? There are a few 
ways that this superiority humor is deployed: through the deployment of hyperbolic masculinity 
and racial disparagement.  
 First, the way in which milk is used in these case studies is heavily saturated with displays 
of a hyperbolic, almost caricatured, masculinity. In the #HWNDU protest, members of the group 
were constantly reinforcing the notion that masculine men drink milk. In one part of the video two 
of the men in the crowd said: 
“If you’re not doing neck workouts, you’re a cuck. If you have a neck harness, you’re a f***ot.” 
“If you can’t squat 315, then you’re worthless,” (Tekajin, 2017). 
These seem like ridiculous standards to hold men to, especially when considering that most of the 
men in this video probably do not measure up to these ridiculously high standards of strength. The 
joke inherent in this display can be understood by considering a few contextual features. As 
discussed earlier, the alt-right and especially 4chan (who were responsible for organizing this 
trolling event) are notorious for their insincerity and ironic style. To “own the libs,” a phrase used 
often in rightwing circles to signal offending liberals, these types of exaggerated displays deploy 
offensive language that is homophobic, sexist, and racist. Even if the display is insincere, though, 
as Billig (2001) argued, the ideas and basis for the joke is still internalized as truth for this group. 
While they may not believe that squatting with three hundred and fifteen pounds of weight is 
necessary to be a man, the idea of masculinity and the superiority of those that adhere to it is still 
communicated and reinforced. PewDiePie’s (2018) proclamations and joking about how soy boys 
are weak and unmanly, while cut through with humor and an acknowledgment of the lack of 
evidence to prove this to be true, reinforces the idea that masculinity is of great importance, even 
if the claims about milk’s masculine providing character is proven false. This appropriation, thus, 
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is less about proving that milk scientifically makes men more masculine and more about the 
opposition to femininity that it represents and symbolizes. 
 Second, the individuals in these case studies also utilize racist humor. On the “Enter the 




These racist proclamations and generalizations are imbued with the structure of transgressive 
humor that have been discussed as endemic to the identity of the alt-right and 4chan in particular. 





The use of racial humor is both used as the basis for interactions and arguments on the site and is 
encoded with a particular style unique to 4chan. This is especially true in the “green text” that 
accompanies the original post: 
> roses are red 
> barack is half-black 
> if you can’t drink milk 
> you have to go back 
This “green text,” a style of posting and storytelling unique to 4chan, is imbued with racist ideas 
and sentiments presented in a way that is playful and engages users on the platform to further 
engage in this transgressive form of humor and entertainment.   
This utilization of racist humor operates as a means of superiority humor. The users of the 
platform that proclaim their whiteness repeatedly throughout the thread differentiate themselves 
from those that they position as racially inferior. Milk consumption, in these posts, becomes a 
placeholder for other more engrained ideas of the racial order. Painter (2011) describes how 
genetic racism in science and history utilized the evolutionary theory of Charles Darwin as a way 
of explaining socially constructed notions of inferiority. Milk appropriation and the racial humor 
attached to it take this new form. For example, saying, “What’s up with Slavs? Is this why they 
are so shit?” (Anonymous, 2017) indicates a previous bias that this user utilized the presented map 
of lactose tolerance to confirm. While this humor indicates functions of ideological belief, it is also 
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functions at a less textual level to afford the alt-right the means to shield themselves inside and 
outside of their ideological spaces. 
Humor as a Shield 
Superiority humor is not only deployed to differentiate themselves from cultural liberalism 
and political correctness, but it is also deployed to provide a level of cover to their ideology whose 
explicit and serious proclamation is stigmatized in the public square. By wrapping their 
expressions of identity in humor, members of the alt-right are able to both deflect serious 
engagement with their ideas and provide themselves plausible deniability. 
First, the humor present here also serves as a way of deflecting and mocking serious 
engagement. The artifacts under analysis represent spaces that primarily engage with an ironically 
coded language and attitude. Superiority humor marginalizes one group as not acceptably fitting 
into some mold or values held by the rhetor (Meyer, 2000), so through mockery, a subject’s power 
is taken away, in this case their reservation or argument against the person making the joke. For 
example, one user on the “Enter the Milk Zone” thread challenges the assumption that white people 
have a predisposition to digesting milk better: 
  
This argument bases itself on the merit of whiteness of the individual while also challenging the 





There is no further elaboration on this point. The argument that a user was making was met with a 
reply that was both incredibly hateful and casual, but in the specific jovial fashion that 4chan 
engages in and has increasingly been adopted by the online right. By shutting down another user 
with both racist and fat phobic comments, they are effectively shut down from the conversation. 
Although the method in which they are shut down is mean-spirited, it is the type of mean-spirited 
humor that provides a cover for those engaging in it. In this way, the users on the platform do not 
need to entertain serious challenges to their mindset and ideology.  
Second, attempts among the alt-right and manosphere to associate racism/sexism with milk 
provides these communities the cover to express taboo or openly bigoted ideas through a symbol 
with a texture of ridiculousness. By jokingly expressing support for milk drinking as white 
supremacy, whether they genuinely believe lactose tolerance indicates racial superiority or not, 
these individuals are given the space to express sentiment unacceptable in the public square. In the 
“He Will Not Divide Us” protest, one of the white shirtless men yelled “We fit now, n****!” 
(Tekajin, 2017). The n-word has a long and painful history being used by white people to denigrate 
and subordinate black people in American society. When looking at the usage here, though, there 
are layers to this usage that make it difficult to categorize. On one hand, it is a white person 
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inappropriately using a term meant to cause emotional harm to black people, but it is also presented 
as a joke, with 4chan’s classic veneer of irony. By positioning the usage of the word as part of the 
comedic interaction and performance, members of these rightwing subcultures are attempting to 
create a shield of plausible deniability, where they can say and do racist things but not suffer the 
repercussions of said racism. 
Milk as superiority humor operates in the same fashion. By placing milk as the focal point 
for jokes, a food item that is extremely common in diets around the world, holding particular 
cultural significance in the U.S. and Europe, all other racist and sexist ideas can be presented with 
a level of protection on the part of the jokester. As Billig (2001) argued, by giving themselves this 
level of plausible deniability, hate groups can spread their ideology more effectively. If their 
character, their ethos is not compromised by their racism, then their credibility at rhetors increases. 
For example, the below interaction from “Enter the Milk Zone” elucidates this concept well. One 
commenter, in response to the thread, stated the following. 
 




The denigration of German and Irish people through the utilization of the n-word is reprehensible 
by most normative moral standards, but the way in which this comment is presented, using what 
would be considered a funny picture of a dog along with the formulaic formation of the response, 
this reply is imbued with the character of humor that Lamont (2019) identified as a transgressive 
subcultural performance, one that can claim both seriousness and non-seriousness. Through this 
transgressive joking, this type of abusive and racist language can become normalized in the public 
square. 4chan was engaging in this type of humor before the emergence of the alt-right and Donald 
Trump as a political figure, with Beran (2017) even arguing that 4chan gave Trump the space to 
become the political figure that he did. 
PewDiePie dispenses superiority humor in the same way in his video, where he rants about 
how soy boys are weak, using several examples of men exhibiting feminine characteristics online, 
stating that the feminization of men through drinking soy milk is endemic. As discussed earlier, 
PewDiePie breaks into chuckles throughout the entire video and even has a section where he states 
that there is no meaningful link between increased estrogen levels in men who consume soy, but 
after this monologue, he immediately dives back into this joking. This break gives him the cover 
to engage in ironic joking, where shocking ideology and viewpoints are both played for laughs 
and, either intentionally or unintentionally, spread and normalized. Regardless of the sincerity of 
his belief in the feminization of soy milk, Felix spreads the soy boy trope in order to generate 
views on his channel, drawing on the people who inhabit the alt-right and manosphere. 
Given the elusive nature of alt-right humor, attempts to counteract the ideology seem 
doomed to fail. By engaging with the trolls, their antics are legitimized in the public square, but if 
they remain disengaged, then what are the ways in which this culture jam can be counteracted. 
While Lasn (1999) discusses at length the character, mission, and methods of culture jammers, not 
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much was written about counteracting their influence because the method was presented as a way 
of countering the corporate establishment. While generating solutions is outside the scope of this 
analysis, it is critical to understand how laughter generated by this culture jam is utilized by the 
alt-right to generate power if solutions are to be constructed to counteract it. 
Laughter is their Jam 
 In avoiding serious engagement and providing plausible deniability, the normalizing power 
of superiority humor (Meyer, 2000) lessens the severity of these racist and sexist transgressions in 
the digital public square, where an individual that wants to make racist and sexist jokes online not 
only is provided the cover to do so, but in making that joke, this insensitivity is reframed as a 
service to community. This is what Wettergren’s (2009) description of the “utopian laughter” in 
culture jamming makes clear. For members of the alt-right, they are laughing at both “normies,” a 
form of the word normal used to describe people outside of the sphere of the online right and 
cultural liberalism. As discussed earlier in this chapter, cultural liberalism is the intended target of 
the joke, the politically correct “establishment” as imagined by the alt-right. By unifying laughter 
against this target, the alt-right uses humor and laughter to culture jam the left through the 
establishment of in-group and out-group identity developed by the creaction of a community 
language. 
Culture jamming is a confrontational practice. For culture jamming to occur, there must be 
an in-group of culture jammers and an out-group that is targeted. As discussed earlier, this creation 
of in-group and out-group is also a function of superiority humor made possible through the 
exclusion of certain behaviors, groups, and ideas through humor (Meyer, 2000). The in-group and 
out-group are created through a variety of methods, but especially relevant to this discussion on 
humor is the satirical capacity of culture jamming and the intertextuality inherent to it. 
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Intertextuality, to reiterate, is the connection between several works or ideas that are present in an 
artifact or case study (Betruccelli Papi, 2019). These can also be understood as “references” in 
popular media, like when a television show or movie places an easter egg or homage to another 
work, or it could be an internet meme format that requires the user to have prior knowledge of the 
format in order to understand the joke. In milk appropriation, this intertextuality that helps the 
group coalesce around this meaning comes in the form of deploying references and jokes that 
individuals within the alt-right and greater internet community would understand, even if they 
have no direct connection with this argument that milk stands for white supremacy and 
masculinity.  
As seen in the protest of the #HWNDU art installment, many of the shirtless men on video 
celebrated the “strength-producing” aspects of milk, using language from online message boards 
like “gains” in their jovial celebration, gains being defined as strength in a measured and quantified 
form. For example, one of the men aggressively compares not finishing your milk to “leaving gains 
on the table,” (Tekajin, 2017). This is not only performative, but this “joke” is also encoding the 
language of these anonymous board sites into the protest. For example, these individuals crashed 
a feed being live streamed by Shia LeBeouf, a celebrity whose art project rallies against Donald 
Trump, a person that these online trolls venerate, even worship as is apparent by the rise of the Q-
anon conspiracy theory. At one point, one of the men yells “JUST DO IT!” a reference to Shia 
Lebouf’s famous and thoroughly meme’d personal motivation video. Referencing a widely 
circulated internet meme operates to construct commonality and group identity. Then, there are 
comments sprinkled throughout the videos by both the men and members of the crowd like: 
“This is the greatest beach episode of an anime ever.” 
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““Alex Jones here! If you don’t take my hyper masculinity man pill for male vitality, you look 
exactly like me, Alex Jones!” 
These are references to popular internet culture and memes that were signaled to indicate their 
belonging to this group of internet culture immersed individuals. 
PewDiePie (2018) spends almost the entirety of his video compiling jokes about soy boys, 
interjecting internet memes such as a frequently used video of Cloud Strife from the video game, 
Final Fantasy VII, laughing, in order to imbue the video with the same brand of humor used on 
platforms like Reddit and 4chan. There are even a few versions of the chad/virgin comparison 
meme presented that is popular in the manosphere to describe the perfectly masculine man and the 
weak feminine man (Lewis, 2019). Richard Spencer deploys intertextuality in his bio in a few 
different ways. For one, Spencer includes the phrase “I’m very tolerant… lactose tolerant,” a joke 
that plays on the criticism that his ideas receive for their nationalistic and racist premises, turning 
that into a reference to milk as a symbol of racial superiority (Swerdloff, 2017). He also includes 
an emoji of milk in between his first and last name as a way of signaling to his followers a further 
acknowledgment of the appropriation of milk. Both of these are intertextual nods that connect milk 
appropriation with other ideas relevant to the movement.  
As Gal (2019) outlined, those who get the humor place themselves in a higher position of 
power at the expense of those who just do not get it. At some level, there is an acknowledgment 
of the ridiculousness of this appropriation, a non-seriousness inherent to the character of milk 
appropriation. As those who “get the joke” and even join in on the joke increase in number, so 
does the alt-right’s ideology. As Zizek had posited, language and our symbolic communication 
beget the development and adherence of ideology (Morgan, 2018). Through the adoptions of this 
superiority humor, the values of the alt-right are actively being performed through humor that 
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serves as a way to socialize individuals into the movement. Billig’s (2001) argument has 
significant resonance here. Just as the Klan utilize racist humor to make their ideology more 
palatable for those in their community, the alt-right is using humor in a new way to accomplish 
the same goal. Just as superiority humor is meant to marginalize those that do not fit in the 
jokester’s acceptable version of reality, milk appropriation and alt-right humor overall is imbued 







Chapter 6: Analysis – Culture Jamming the Left through an Affective Political 
Aesthetic of Trolling 
Trolling is an action that is paradoxically sincere and insincere. How so? Trolling is sincere 
in the sense that it is the genuine expression of the troll’s worldview, one that views the taboo parts 
of the world as a playground of sorts. Trolling is insincere as well, though, because it relies on 
tricking or baiting one or more people into reacting in a certain way. Thus far, I have outlined what 
the alt-right is saying with milk appropriation and how humor is utilized against cultural liberalism 
and perceived inferior others. In this chapter, I argue that the character of the alt-right and their 
political aesthetic can best be understood through understanding the power of trolling as a method 
of culture jamming.  
Disruption and critique through trolling 
Trolling the digital age is a relatively new phenomenon. While people have always tried to 
play tricks on one another for various reasons, the internet has empowered people to engage in a 
form of trickery performed on a mass scale for the sake of internal satisfaction. Trolling and 
subsequently, the alt-right, is a chaotic ideology. The goal is not to unify under a single endearing 
and established set of immutable principles. Rather the goal of these efforts is to generate chaos 
“for the lulz,” (Woods & Hahner, 2019). The ideological consequences of this is that the troll 
ethos, the character and credibility of the internet troll is inextricably tied with undermining the 
power of a target (Fichman & Dainas, 2019). Now, to reiterate, trolling is not a practice only 
utilized by white supremacists, but all sorts subcultural and countercultural groups utilize trolling 
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to target and delegitimize groups that they deem worthy of ridicule or opposition. But, its use by 
white supremacists and the manosphere combined with milk symbolism operate in very interesting 
ways, particularly in their culture jamming capacity. 
Culture jamming and the art of trolling, in the case of the alt-right, are also linked but not 
necessarily equivalent. For a culture jam to occur, a sign or symbol from the targeted entity must 
be appropriated with an intent to satirize. Thus, not all trolling would fit under this definition, such 
as intentionally using racial slurs in a joking fashion or gathering a group of internet users to 
constantly report a page to have it taken down. How does using milk as a symbol, though, qualify 
as culture jamming? As discussed earlier, milk has come to represent an array of ideas and values, 
from giving life to youth to American nutritional exceptionalism. They are taking milk, a beverage 
venerated historically for its health benefits, and twisting it to stand for white supremacy and 
masculinity, but this resignification is only half of the story.  
Implicit in these artifacts is both a self-awareness and celebration surrounding the 
ridiculousness of milk appropriation. Just as the humorous nature of their interactions allows them 
to deflect serious engagement and insulate themselves from serious criticism, this appropriation of 
milk critiques people’s sensibilities to issues like racism and sexism. For example, the 
proclamation of the O.K. being a symbol white power was begun as a way of seeing if people 
would be gullible enough to believe in the sincerity of this symbolism. This ended up working 
because entities such as the Anti-Defamation League and Southern Poverty Law Center designated 
it as a white power symbol (Swales, 2019), and that interpretation of the O.K. sign to this day is 
associated with white power. This is an example of how 4chan used trolling and irony to 
appropriate an innocuous and common hand sign into a white supremacist dog whistle. Lewis 
(2019) further argues that the alt-right has engaged in this process with the intention of making the 
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cultural left seem ridiculous in its alarmism over this activity. This can be categorized as “bait,” or 
information that is intended to activate negative reactions from a group of people. One of the men 
drinking milk at the #HWNDU protest sarcastically yells: “This is fascism, shirtless men drinking 
milk,” (Tekajin, 2017). Obviously, given the tone and history of deriding political correctness, this 
is anticipating a response from the media and the online left. By proclaiming that shirtless men 
drinking milk is fascism, a statement used to signal simultaneous sincerity and insincerity, those 
who buy into this symbolism in a negative way are derided and trolled.  
To understand the significance of this trolling, understanding the critique that it is crafting 
is critical. The humor of the alt-right and manosphere, that shock humor that has little regard for 
personal sensitivity and moral norms, does more than upset for the sake of upsetting. Both 
deception and trolling, in their performance, critique the durability of a person’s emotional 
resilience, exploiting the defensive strategies that people implement in online spaces when faced 
with impoliteness (Ismail et al., 2020). This critique of sensibility argues for the abridgment of 
sanctity in our public discourse to disrupt and weaken the legitimacy of the targeted entity. The 
jovial disposition of the troll who is unbothered and the provocative nature of the trolling defy and 
juxtapose the troll with the perceived fragility of people that the trolling targets. For example, one 
of the #HWNDU protestors said, “you may not like it, but this is the face of white nationalism,” 
(Tekajin, 2017). This is a very pointed jab at our aversion to white supremacy, an implicit 
acknowledgment of the inflammatory nature of this performance. In Richard Spencer’s Twitter 
bio at this time, the line, “I’m very tolerant.... lactose tolerant,” refers to the broad history of 
Richard Spencer being derided for his white supremacist rhetoric and ideas (Swerdloff, 2017). By 
this turn of phrase, Spencer plays with this intolerant perception of himself to critique his “haters” 
and their sensitivities. Through this process, the troll disempowers its target through representing 
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them as too sensitive, emotional, or reactive. By giving the troll the reaction that they want, their 
mission and enjoyment are accomplished. This revelry and disregard reveal important aspects of 
the troll’s character. 
The Troll Ethos 
Trolling operates not only as the culture jamming modus operandi but also as a means of 
establishing style, character, and especially political aesthetic. Per Nadeau’s (2019) description of 
political aesthetic, the very action of joining this group of people trolling cultural liberalism and 
political correctness emits an aesthetic that both encompasses and transforms their ideology. By 
building community in this way, the alt-right and manosphere are manufacturing what I call the 
“troll ethos,” or the character of the troll in public discourse that serves the aesthetic purposes of 
trolling. The troll is not only defined by what they do, but who they want themselves to be. Thus, 
the “troll ethos” can be understood as encapsulating three roles: rebellious prankster, oppositional 
digital citizen, and edge lord. 
 As discussed previously, the prankster tradition of trolling, from Anonymous hacktivism 
to 4chan coordinated protest, compose the first part of the troll ethos. Insincerity and non-
seriousness are weaponized to discredit and delegitimize serious discussions. In doing so, the troll 
is establishing a prankster aesthetic, an affective identity that prizes chaos as a means of rebellion. 
In this chaos, laughter is the unifying force drawing these trolls and those that support them 
together for enjoyment at the expense of others. For example, by crashing Shia Lebouf’s 
#HWNDU art exhibit that was being live streamed, the trolls in this care were subverting the 
hopeful message of the project. The point of this art project was to inspire unity and resilience 
despite the election of Donald Trump. By crashing this live stream with displays of white 
supremacist dog whistles and symbolism with one of the trolls even wearing a Make America 
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Great Again hat, these trolls are upholding a prankster tradition. This humorous disposition meant 
to target others not only provides these communities with the bonding power of prankster politics 
but also instills an oppositional attitude in its character as well. 
 Another part of the troll ethos is its oppositional style. Trolls inherently juxtapose themself 
to those that they are trolling. Whether it is a difference in ideology, belief, goals, or, in the case 
of how milk is utilized, sensitivity, trolling is an oppositional practice, so the character of those 
that practice it have an oppositional component to themselves. The #HWNDU protestors (Tekajin, 
2017) and PewDiePie (2018) identify individuals who are worth derision because of physical and 
genetic inferiority due to the presence of (or lack thereof) milk drinking. Even with those that agree 
with the troll or are in the same digital spaces are subject to this level of opposition and aggression, 
as we see in this reply to the “Enter the Milk Zone” 4chan thread: 
 
This person uses the acronym “kys” which stands for “kill yourself,” a very charged oppositional 
comment that is made in the spirit of the board and character of the troll’s no holds barred attitude. 
In their oppositional nature, an inclination toward edgy humor is also present. Lasn (1999) talks 
about the character of the culture jammer as incessantly oppositional, as “shock troopers” on the 
front line taking on others. Lasn (1999) clearly outlines this mode of action here: 
“Culture jamming is, at root, just a metaphor for stopping the flow of spectacle long enough 
to adjust your set. Stopping the flow relies on an element of surprise.” 
“Stopping the flow” with “an element of surprise” represents this oppositional disposition of the 
troll ethos very well. For opposition, the goal to rebut and/or grind the other to a halt. For the trolls 
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at the #HWNDU installation or those on 4chan or even Richard Spencer smugly co-opting 
language used to deride him, milk appropriation serves as a venue of opposition, where this 
normative symbol of nutrition becomes the sword to attack the racial or de-masculinized other.  
The final part of the troll ethos is the enjoyment of edginess as an aesthetic. As 
Hoedemaekers (2011) discussed, offensive humor provides psychological relief by cutting through 
the serious nature of social issues. Now, edgy humor can operate as a source of real moral and 
cultural critique, to challenge established and assumed norms. The emancipatory potential of the 
offensive joke and even that of the troll ethos can and has been harnessed for thoughtful social 
critique. Unfortunately, that legitimate social critique is often overshadowed by the white 
supremacist and manosphere troll, who harnesses this aspect of the troll ethos to rally against moral 
sensibilities through celebrating transgression, not solely because it has a problem with any one 
value or set of values concerning race and gender, but because the veneration of edgy humor gives 
the troll a countercultural position, one opposed to elite standards and criticism. 
 The prankster attitude, oppositional disposition, and edgy humor provide the troll ethos an 
outward expression of character that is not just present in the individual person. The diffuse nature 
of trolling, how this character does not define any individual person but a collective identity is 
significant because cultural identities and attitudes spread and evolve, and we have seen this ethos 
evolve from the domains of the alt-right and manosphere into our broader network. The 
participation in this mass trolling engages people in an affective fashion, connecting them not only 
through organized activity, but by having them feel a sense of belonging through their performance 
of political identity. For instance, as the trolls at the #HWNDU art installation did not just utter 
the words found in the script. They generated an air of fun for themselves, where they connected 
through revelry and emotionally attached themselves to this troll aesthetic. 
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Disingenuous Engagement as Expectation 
This development of the troll ethos is meant to inspire a chaotic and disorganized character 
of digital discourse that muddies the waters surrounding genuine expression. As a consequence of 
the aforementioned character of the troll, who uses humor to deflect serious inquiry and 
engagement, whose use of humor can sanction individuals that take the troll too seriously, not only 
is the alt-right culture jamming the left through muddying the waters of what the alt-right 
represents and harnessing laughter as a tool for disruption, they are also inserting doubt and 
disbelief into our understanding of genuineness. This “troll ethos” not only subverts those that are 
ideologically opposed to them but it subverts the assumption of genuine engagement itself.  
In the #HWNDU protest, one of the men yells, “This is the champion. You don’t want abs? 
You don’t want to hurt animals? F*** you,” (Tekajin, 2017). This statement references the need 
to drink cow milk in order to achieve strength and vitality. The interesting quote here, though, is 
“you don’t want to hurt animals?” because this idea of bringing animals active harm is typically a 
rhetorical tool of animal rights activists that wish to end the horrid conditions of factory farming. 
Not only is this person acknowledging that fact, they are celebrating it. On its face, this statement 
can be taken seriously, that this individual enjoys the idea of animals being harmed and that they 
genuinely believe in these ideas. But there is no guarantee if this speech is the genuine expression 
of the person saying it or a transgressive subversion of normal moral standards to get a rise out of 
vegans or animal rights activists who would seriously disagree with this sentiment. Likewise, 
PewDiePie is constantly in troll mode that makes it difficult to determine the legitimacy and 
truthfulness of his belief system. He constantly states, “Why would I make this up?” and “I am not 
even memeing right now,” in talking about soy boys. And more likely than not, he probably does 
not believe that drinking soy milk will cause “man boobs” as he puts it. But the extent to which he 
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believes in anti-feminism and all of the other values wrapped up in this appropriation of milk is 
unclear. Leaving the audience guessing and without definitive answers is the point. In creating 
doubt in the genuineness of one’s expression, the “troll ethos” allows for a person to don a cloak 







Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 While it may be easy to dismiss the appropriation of milk as a trivial matter of some obscure 
circle of rightwing trolls, there are very real implications for this style of politics, namely a politics 
of outrage and provocation. Our news cycle relies on a series of inflammatory and controversial 
content to sustain itself, and these types of cultural landmines obscure and satirize conversations 
surrounding systemic inequality and violence. While this specific type of symbolism is not the sole 
culprit for this phenomenon, I have established a significant link through my analysis between the 
style of politics milk appropriation represents and these wide-ranging implications, namely 
providing an ecosystem for the extreme online right to blossom and legitimizing a brand of 
transgressive spectacle politics. In another sense, I believe that it is useful to consider the analysis 
presented here in the context of what Deluca and Peeples (2002) call the public screen. 
 Deluca & Peeples (2002) analyze the public sphere, the foundational social theory that is 
defined as a “social space wherein private citizens gather as a public body with the rights of 
assembly, association, and expression in order to form public opinion.” In their analysis, they 
identify several problems with the public sphere as a totalizing explanation of public 
communication because it prioritizes dialogue and physical space as necessary to the process of 
developing and constructing public opinion. While Deluca & Peeples (2002) recognize the 
importance of the public sphere as an explanatory social theory, they state that the presence of 
mass media necessitates an updated conception of the public sphere, that they identify as the public 
screen, an iteration of the public sphere centered on the idea of mass media consumption that still 
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operates to shape and respond to public opinion. The public screen encompasses the methods of 
mass media like television, movies, and the internet that simultaneously shrink the distance 
between people/ideas and expand our interaction with the world. People are not gathering in coffee 
shops and town halls as the primary venue for their political development. But rather, their 
interactions with mass media become the “public square” where we not only discuss issues in a 
new way, but mass media, particularly the internet, have introduced a “new way of being,” or 
forging our civic identities in a mass distributed fashion (Deluca & Peeples, 2002).  
The January 6 Capitol insurrection was more than just an event that signaled the increasing 
presence of polarization present in our country. It was also an event, upon further examination, 
that indicates the frightening power of the public screen as a center of political discourse, where 
these politically extreme rightwing movements have been able to build a following to inspire 
terroristic opposition. The FBI has uncovered an intricate level of organization among many 
people who participated, from several events across social media (mainly Facebook) to having 
earpieces and walkie talkies to coordinate movement (Cheney & Gerstein, 2021). The diffuse 
nature of social media combined with the inflammatory politics that motivated this kind of action 
provided a space for groups like Q-anon and Proud Boys to plan and spread word of this event. 
Milk appropriation and that type of performative bait politics, while it no longer holds the same 
kind of cultural relevance or influence now, gave way for the alt-right and manosphere to translate 
their goals and ideology into movements with broader support like Q-Anon and the Proud Boys. 
While the intersection of people in these groups is not perfect, the style and mission of all these 
subcultural groups intersect at multiple points, in mission and style so much so that analyzing one 
without considering the other leaves us with an incomplete understanding. While Deluca & 
Peeples (2002) description of a participatory politics through the intersection of media and people 
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is presented with hope for democratic politics, much like Lasn’s (1999) presentation of culture 
jamming, these same principles can be understood as threatening democracy, just as much as they 
can support and promote democracy. Analyzing the evolution of these cultural contours and style 
are imperative to understanding how the online right has gone from threatening feminist video 
game critics and sharing racist memes to plotting insurrectionary action against U.S. democratic 
processes.  
 There is also the normalization of transgressive politics. By normalizing egregiously racist 
and sexist beliefs through humor that aims to discredit anti-racism and feminist praxis, most 
problematic systems of beliefs can be legitimized under the guise of opposition to cultural 
liberalism. The troll ethos, as I have described, operates best when it is seen as an anti-
establishment force, one that rejects the cultural norms that it claims is restricting its expression 
and destroying its cultural foundation. This argument has historically led to a rise in the amount of 
hate activity. Whenever progress is made on issues of racial equality, there is backlash by 
rightwing movements, just as was seen after the Civil Rights movement and the election of Barack 
Obama (Johnson & Urquhart, 2020). What makes this current backlash to Black Lives Matter and 
current racial awareness/progress so endemic and even more dangerous is how the internet and a 
lack of digital literacy among U.S. adults (Feldman, 2019) facilitates misinformation and the 
outrage that accompanies it. Members of these extreme rightwing online communities operate as 
bad faith actors, and the more that our information ecosystem is filled with these hate symbols and 
brand of cynical humor, the more that transgression is not only normalized but celebrated. The 
valorization of “cancelled” figures by the Republican Party stands as evidence for this 
normalization of transgressive politics, where a culture of “own the libs” or beating the political 




Understanding this cultural evolution better equips us to deal with this rising tide of 
political extremism. While this present analysis sets forth the problem, solutions are the next 
primary step that must be taken to counter this type of symbolic appropriation and its cultural 
consequences. By finding ways to improve our information literacy, draw attention away from 
spectacle performances of identity, and critically examine the significance of humor as a tool of 
radicalization; we can effectively change our discursive culture and shut off the way for extremism 




1) Transcript of protest at Shia Lebouf’s #HWNDU art exhibit 
“Don’t let your memes be dreams, take a f***ing chance.” 
“JUST DO IT!” 
“Alex Jones here! If you don’t take my hyper masculinity man pill for male vitality, you 
look exactly like me, Alex Jones!” 
“Look at these ripped abs!” (gesturing to man lifting up his shirt) “This is masculine 
perfection!” 
“Check it!” (flexing) 
“Full Masculinity” (pointing to people flexing) 
“We fit now, n****” 
“Stop masturbating” (yelled at someone in the crowd surrounding them repeatedly. 
[A few minutes go by of them laughing and showing each other things on their phones] 
“Ban this, mods” 
[at this point, the start picking up milk and drinking it] 
“Got milk, motherf***er” 
“Got f***ing milk, look at these proteins.” 
“It’s all white” 
“You may not like it, but this is the face of white nationalism.” 
“Now with six grams of protein.”  
“Right f***ing here, I drink a gallon of this. F***ing learn. F***ing learn.” 
“If you don’t drink a gallon of this a day, you are leaving gains on the table.” 
“This is fascism, shirtless men drinking milk.” 
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[Takes a big gulp of milk] “Woooo!” 
“This is how the Vikings conquered Europe!” 
“With milk!” 
“Whole milk. None of that 2% shit.” 
“2% is a subversive lie. Whole milk, whole milk is the way!”  
[Everyone stands back for one of the men to spit milk out, which landed on the camera] 
“Got milk, motherf***er!” 
[observer of the group coming up to the camera] “This is the greatest beach episode of an 
anime ever.” 
“You wanna be here? I’ll carry you right now.” 
“You got testosterone here.” 
“WHOLE MILK!!” 
A person is picked up, and the entire crowd begins to chant: “MILK BUILDS GAINS!” 
repeatedly, and then at the end, a few people change it to “KILL BILL GATES” 
Person who was being carried comes up to the camera with a gallon of milk and says, 
“Cheers. Got milk.” 
“There you have it, all of the milkmen. The party’s all here. F***ing dream team, man.” 
[one guy comes up to the camera to simulate boxing] 
“Admire these f***ing gains.” 
“I’m a lumberjack and that’s okay. I drink my milk and I work all day.” 
“Down with the vegan agenda.” 
“A nice cold glass of pure racism. Get it down here.” 
“You think I got this from veganism? F*** no. [unintelligible] This (holds up milk) 
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Protein. Pint shit? What do you think, we’re a p***y. (yells to crowd) Are we p***ies?” 
“NO!” 
“EXACTLY!!!” 
[Lots of flexing and screaming] 
“If you’re not doing neck workouts, you’re a cuck. If you have a neck harness, you’re a 
f***ot.” 
“If you can’t squat 315, then you’re worthless.”  
“You may not like it, but this is peak masculinity right now.” [man starts flexing with the 
group of men hyping up his masculinity] 
“This is the champion. You don’t want abs? You don’t want to hurt animals? F*** you.” 
The crowd begins chanting “CHUG THAT MILK!” as one of the group is held up in the 
air with a gallon of milk. 
“This is for you, Milk Viking, Milk man, I love you.” 
































3) Richard Spencer Twitter bio 
 
 
4) Transcript of ’s video S O Y B O Y S 
Opening with man in white tank top: “All right guys, we’re coming at you with another crazy 
analogy for something that people really have a misconception of when it comes to just myths 
and fitness related things that we believe because somebody said something and then I heard Joe 
Shmoe say it and now I believe it, alright? So, here’s what we’re talking about today. We’re 
talkinga bout soy milk. Now, I drink soy milk.” 
PewDiePie: SOOOOOY BOOOOOY 
Cuts to another video of a man in a maroon shirt and bandana: “I did sort of buy into the myth 
that, you know, soy was going to affect my testosterone levels and it might cause me to, I don’t 
know make less muscle gains.” 
PewDiePie: Soy boy! Soy boy. What an absolute soy boy. 
Cuts to a video of a man in a blue shirt: “Marc Lobliner, tigerfitness.com. Bitch tits. And soy. I 
remember it hit, like, in 2004. A crappy little website decided to put out an article on how soy 
increases estrogen. You might as well be taking your girl’s birth control pills.” 
PewDiePie: Soy boys: These pathetic beta males. Just look how weak they are. Weaklings, 
pathetic. Absolute scumbags. Social and physical degenerates. It’s laughable. 
*cuts to clip of Cloud Strife from Final Fantasy VII laughing* 
PewDiePie: But it’s not just laughable. It is also harmful. Soy Boys are reproducing. They are 
creating beta males from left to right causing the destruction of western civilization. Needs to be 
stopped! I am NOT even memeing right now. This is not meme review. This is a very serious 
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topic of discussion that needs to be brought up. Don’t believe the dangers of soy? Just look at the 
Soy Prince himself, Will Wheaton. 
*Cuts to clip of Wil Wheaton tweet* 
PewDiePie: Glug glug glug glug glug glug more soy milk bring me the bottle and leave it. He’s 
telling people to consume more soy. Soy has estrogen in it so that means if you consume soy, 
you might as well be a woman, you know that right?  
*Cuts to definition of gynaecomastia* 
Gynaecomastia. Man boobs, that’s right. If you consume soy, you might as well flaunt your – 
Wear a bra like a little (laughs). If you consume soy, you might as well put on a bra right now 
and then wait for the man boobs to come. This is after and before soy. Do you understand?  
*Inserts meme of virgin soy boy and Chad Onionman* 
PewDiePie: Virgin Soy boy? Has actual brain tumor. That’s right. Soy causes all kinds of 
(laughs). This is not me spreading misinformation. This is just proven scientific facts. It causes 
male breast cancer. Nowhere hairy but on his feet. Carrot calves. Moving on to Chad. Perfect 
eyesight 20/20. Pee is white like milk. Soy boy is causing the destruction of western civilization. 
The dis-demasculinization of man has caused all these pathetic beta males to just multiply as an 
army. They’re taking over. What are we going to do? But I’m here to fight back. Finally 
someone that dares to stand up against these issues of the sort. Just look at jacksepticeye himself. 
This is before and after soy by the way. Absolute alpha from a pathetic youtuber beta male. 
Disgusting. I know it hurts to see my friends become a victim of soy. But how can we spot a soy 
boy Felix? Oh, don’t worry. I will tell you.  
*Picture of man with caption “HIGH TESTOSTERONE FACE” 
PewDiePie: Here’s a high testosterone face, very defined facial structure just as mine of course. I 
would say mine is probably even a couple level of alpha more than this man. It’s probably my 
Viking Swedish genes. Eehh... 
*Switch to picture of bald man with beard and mouth open* 
PewDiePie: And here you have a classic, the quintessential soy face. Balding head or fully bald, 
awkward beard, glasses, and overly excited face. I can’t. I can’t even. I can’t even recreate this. 
It is truly truly despicable stuff that we’re seeing here.  
*Shows meme of mem with their mouths open smiling with caption “is this the male version of 
duck face.” 
PewDiePie: It’s basically the male version of duck face. Soy boys just can’t help themselves. 
They get too excited about their Nintendo Switch. I understand. A video game console designed 
for little children. Why wouldn’t they be excited about it? What’s next? They’re gonna start 
building cardboard? Oh, they already do that. Oh look at PJ, my own friend, suffering from 
(laughs). Jack, PJ, who are they going to take next? Brad? Oh? 
*Cuts to long haired man shirtless with lipstick on* 
PewDiePie: Oh, it’s already happening. I can’t even tell them apart from my own girlfriend these 
days. Do you understand how hard this is? They are working together. This is not just me 
making some stuff up. This is a real conspiracy if you want to spot a Soy Boy, just dangle a 
Nintendo switch controller in front of them. They'll start jumping up and down excitedly. 
Immediately, and that's how you know you need to euthanize them at the spot. It is it is our duty 
for mankind, for our kind. Sorry. I don't want to discriminate against women on this channel. 
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*Cuts to Reddit post of man holding Nintendo Switch* 
PewDiePie: I had a vasectomy yesterday, and when I woke up my wife's boyfriend surprised me 
with. How nice of the boyfriend. There is just too many examples for this to not be fact. You 
think I'm just making things. It writes itself I came to open your eyes sheeple to the Soy Boy 
conspiracy. You want to know why I didn't play God of War on my channel because they might 
as well call it god of soy. Why is he bald and have a beard? There's no way. Why do you think I 
even shaved my beard? Soy.. to... to protect myself from soy. Do you think this is just made up 
huh? They have been feeding soy to kids since we were children. Soy bean crayon. You ever 
wonder why soy- the crayons are so delicious. That's because they've been feeding it to children. 
They've even created purely soy-based meals called something Soylent who just by the way 
sponsoring this video, thank you very much Soylent I appreciate. 
*Cuts to Twitter post of a man standing in front of a Soylent truck* 
PewDiePie: Walking down the street, spot the soylent truck, now I'm drinking sweet chai 
breakfast- Jesse Cox, I'm worried about you. I've already lost PJ. I've already lost Jack. I've 
already lost Brad one. Not Jesse Cox. What's next? Is he gonna tweet about Barron Trump? 
*Cuts to Twitter post by Jesse Cox* 
PewDiePie: I am gonna say it. I hate Barron T- 0.0 JESSE COX! You’ve taking two steps too far 
right now. Soylent has turned people so weak they can't even open the bottle themselves, but it's 
so easy.  
*Cuts to tweet about difficulty opening soylent* 
PewDiePie: “I bench 350 and I cannot open a goddamn bottle of Soylent.” Well, maybe because 
you consume soy. Maybe it's because you're turning into a WOmAn.  
*Cuts to tweet about difficulty opening soylent* 
PewDiePie: “I find myself unable to open the drink.” Maybe that's why everyone is just posing 
with it instead of actually drinking it because people just can't help themselves. Posing with their 
Soylent bottle nothing like a selfie with your beverage. Wait isn't that? Isn't that the host of bully 
hunters? How far does this conspiracy go? Yeah look it says here. 
*Cuts to Nati Casanova Twitter, host of bully hunters* 
PewDiePie: “Sponsored by Soylent,” but she tweeted, very recently, “no soy.” She tweeted “no 
soy gringo corrado” which is Spanish for “no more, Soylent, please. It's turning me into a 
deformed creature.” And look at that she lost her Soylent sponsor. How far does the Soylent 
conspiracy go? You think I'm just making this up? Who you think is calling you a soy boy. Who 
is actually calling you a soy boy. Don't listen to this fake meme propaganda. This is not true. The 
left side is always correct. 
Okay for real. No jokes aside. It showed that estrogen is in soy, but it's not the same estrogen that 
your body produces so--So consuming soy shouldn't actually have any cause on your body or 
make you more feminine or make you produce less sperm. That's all just a- that just all a meme 
that's just spiralled out of control. And I feel like I have to be responsible here and call it out so 
that people stop using soy boy as some sort of insult. Cause it's not just mean, it's also extremely 
hurtful, I just can't understand why anyone would call someone else a soy to prove some fact that 
just because there are lesser man, and enjoy watching someone else have sex with their wife that 
somehow makes them less. I just- We need to- We need to reduce this stigma. Because it's all 
about the onion! That's right. If you're not an onion man, and consume at least six raw onions a 
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day, which is the only scientific proven way to increase your sperm count by the way huh don't 
believe this year you heard about this. Onions are the opposite of soyo. Not even meming. You 
know who else like onions That's right. The most masculine man of mankind 
*Cuts to picture of Shrek* 
Shrek. If you don't eat onion at least once a day, then you're part of the problem. You think I'm 
just making this up? Onions help keep your heart healthy, helps you control diabetes, improves 
immunity lower stress helps protect cancer keeps your skin healthy, and look at that, boosts your 
sperm count. Doesn't matter if you're a woman or a man you need to consume onions. You may 
not like it, but this is what peak performance look like. 
*Cuts to picture showing two men* 
onion man vs. soy boy. Okay, that was a video. Hey.. of course there's one way to very quickly 
and effectively cure your soy boy, and it's by purchasing one of the Сука Блять merch. Limited 
time only. Check out link in the description to prove that you're a real alpha. That's right, I'm 
using memes to sell me merch. got a problem? Well, you must be full of soy, boy. 
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